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INTRODUCTION
Unifying principles for calculating damages lie in the shadow of
contract law. These principles reflect the goals underlying the rules
formalized in Article 2 of the Uniform Commercial Code (UCC),' the
Restatement (Second) of Contracts2 and their computational methods. The
Shadow Code presented in this Article combines these principles and
formulas into a new image of legal remedies for contract breach.3  This
reconceptualization is based on the foundational principle4 that parties
injured by contract breach are entitled to any surplus of benefits over costs
those parties would have realized had the breaching parties performed. The
Shadow Code reflects the modem understanding that damages are intended
to ensure that the injured party is as well off as if the other party had
performed as promised.5
1. Uniform Commercial Code §§ 2-702 to 2-715 (2001) [hereinafter U.C.C.].
2. RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF CONTRACTS §§ 347-49 (1981) [hereinafter
RESTATEMENT].
3. This Article is not concerned with either equitable remedies for contract breach,
such as restitution and specific performance, remedies for breaches of non-contractual
promises, such as those involved in cases of promissory estoppel, or remedies when the
existence of the contract is denied, as in cases involving rescission.
4. The Shadow Code's underlying principle is "foundational" in the same sense that
the formal statements of the goals of contract damages in the U.C.C. and Restatement are-
each articulates an equivalent compensatory premise upon which computational formulas
are based and to which exceptions apply. The most significant exceptions are described in
Section 4 of the Shadow Code, infra, Part II1.C, which codifies the traditional limitations on
recovery to those losses that are foreseeable, demonstrable, and unavoidable. George M.
Cohen's article, The Fault Lines in Contract Damages, 80 VA. L. REv. 1225 (1994), may be
the most complete exploration of the contract doctrines that lead away from the foundational
principle. His thesis is that courts' departures from the foundational principle can be
systematically explained by their tendency to create desirable incentives for parties to, for
instance, perform contracts that should be performed, refrain from opportunistically
breaching other contracts, avoid making contracts that should not be made, and take
precautions to avoiding breaching. Id. at 1231-32. We do not question that limitations on
the foundational principle have desirable incentive effects. See, e.g., David W. Barnes, The
Anatomy of Contract Damages and Efficient Breach Theory, 6 S. CAL. INTERDISC. L.J. 397,
470-80 (1998) [hereinafter, Barnes, Anatomy of Contract Damages] (considering the
incentive effects of the traditional limitations on recovery identified above, liquidated
damage rules, and rules governing awards of specific performance). Nor do we propose in
the Shadow Code any rules that modify the incentive structures created by the exceptions to
the principle. As a result, Professor Cohen's classification of cases as deservedly getting
special treatment by limitations and exceptions is not affected by the surplus-based
approach.
5. See U.C.C. § 1-106(1) ("The remedies provided by this Act shall be liberally
administered to the end that the aggrieved party may be put in as good a position as if the
other party has fully performed."); RESTATEMENT § 347 cmt. a ("Contract damages are
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This Article justifies restating the law of damages in a single black
letter rule applicable to all breaches of contract. The surplus-based
approach to damages recognizes an injured party's entitlement to the
difference between the surplus he or she would have realized had the other
performed as promised and the actual surplus obtained. Section 1 of the
Shadow Code articulates this central principle. It applies to all types of
parties injured in all types of partial and total contract breaches, whether
consumers or merchants, buyers or sellers.
The central principle of the Shadow Code is as dramatic a restatement
of contract damage rules as the Learned Hand formula was for the theory of
negligence. 6 Judge Hand recast the "community expectations" approach
7
in a way that gave substantive content to'what a reasonable person would
have done in similar circumstances. The BPL formula focused scholars'
attention not only on how to prove negligence, but on what objectives a
negligence rule furthers.8 The surplus-based approach to contract damages
described in the Shadow Code analogously balances costs and benefits-
those associated with performance and those associated with breach. By
relating surplus to the improvement in wellbeing, whether associated with
performance or breach, the Shadow Code focuses attention on the
motivation for awarding damages. The Learned Hand formula is an
ordinarily based on the injured party's expectation interest and are intended to give him the
benefit of his bargain by awarding him a sum of money that will, to the extent possible, put
him in as good a position as he would have been in had the contract been performed.").
6. While Judge Learned Hand had articulated the cost-benefit approach to analyzing
negligence since at least 1931, see Stephen G. Gilles, United States v. Carroll Towing Co.:
The Hand Formula's Home Port, in TORT STORIES 18 n.37 (Robert L. Rabin & Stephen D.
Sugarman eds., 2003) (quoting opinions dating from 1931 to 1940), the first algebraic
description of the formula came in United States v. Carroll Towing Co., 159 F.2d 169, 173
(2d Cir. 1947), where, evaluating the costs and benefits of having a bargee present on the
barge at a particular time, Judge Hand stated:
Since there are occasions when every vessel will break from her moorings, and
since, if she does, she becomes a menace to those about her; the owner's duty, as
in other similar situations, to provide against resulting injuries is a function of
three variables: (1) the probability that she will break away; (2) the gravity of the
resulting injury, if she does; (3) the burden of adequate precautions. Possibly it
serves to bring this notion into relief to state it in algebraic terms: if the
probability be called P; the injury, L; and the burden, B; liability depends upon
whether B is less than L multiplied by P: i.e., whether B < PL.
Carroll Towing Co., 159 F.2d at 173.
7. Gilles, supra note 6, at 33-34 (describing the "community expectations" approach as
looking to social understanding and norms and what we can fairly expect from one another
as a guide to society's best interests).
8. See, e.g., Richard A. Posner, A Theory of Negligence, 1 J. LEGAL STUD. 29 (1972)
(describing incentives created by rules of negligence, contributory negligence and related
doctrines).
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articulation of what the law of negligence implicitly requires and how
reasonable people behave, whether they know it or not. The surplus-based
approach similarly describes what the law has already embraced, but has
not implicitly recognized.
At the same time, the surplus-based rule is unlikely to be as
controversial as the Learned Hand negligence formula and is much easier
to apply in practice. Judge Hand recognized in Carroll Towing that his
cost-benefit analysis dealt with incommensurables, 9 variables for which
information is unavailable and between which comparisons cannot be
made.10 Most contract cases, by contrast, involve monetizable costs and
benefits. For contracts cases, non-quantifiability is routinely handled by
rules of evidence (losses must be proved with "reasonable certainty") 1' and
blanket prohibitions (no subjective or psychic losses allowed "even if the
limitations of unforeseeability and uncertainty can be overcome"). 12 The
Learned Hand test was also a change from a cultural "community
expectations" perspective to an economic perspective. The surplus-based
approach requires no novel types of unusual information. 3  While
reflecting a consideration of costs and benefits, the surplus-based approach
alters neither the philosophic orientation of damage rules nor, generally, the
9. Conway v. O'Brien, 111 F.2d 611, 612 (2d Cir. 1940) ("All these are practically not
susceptible of any quantitative estimate, and the second two [factors, P and L,] are generally
not so, even theoretically. For this reason a solution always involves some preference, or
choice between incommensurables, and it is consigned to a jury because their decision is
thought most likely to accord with commonly accepted standards, real or fancied.").
10. See Gilles, supra note 6, at 28-33 (discussing these two criticisms of the Learned
Hand formula).
11. See E. ALLAN FARNSWORTH, CONTRACTS § 12.15, at 800 (4th ed. 2004);
RESTATEMENT § 352. This rule is reflected in section 4 of the Shadow Code, infra Part
III.C.
12. FARNSWORTH, supra note 11, § 12.17, at 810. See, e.g., Silva v. Albuquerque
Assembly & Distrib. Freeport Warehouse Corp., 738 P.2d 513, 514 (N.M. 1987) (holding
that "damages for emotional distress are not recoverable in an action for breach of an
employment contract ... in the absence of a showing that the parties contemplated such
damages at the time the contract was made"). Sometimes, however, the result is justified on
the ground of unforeseeability or uncertainty. See, e.g., Hatfield v. Max Rouse & Sons
Northwest, 606 P.2d 944, 951 (Idaho 1980) (denying recovery to owner of logging
equipment for "emotional distress" resulting from auctioneer's sale of equipment below
minimum specified price because it was "simply impossible to imagine that the parties...
contemplated that [the owner] might suffer emotional distress upon its breach."). There are
several exceptions to the rule denying recovery for emotional distress. "Some courts have
looked to the nature of the contract and made exceptions... where serious emotional
disturbance was a particularly likely result of breach." FARNSWORTH, supra note 11,
§ 12.17, at 810. Other courts have allowed recovery where the nature of the breach was
"reprehensible, perhaps amounting to a tort, or that it caused bodily harm." Id.
13. Categorical prohibitions of recovery of certain types of losses are discussed infra
text accompanying notes 138-147.
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bottom line amount of damages awarded. This Article demonstrates the
equivalence of the Shadow Code to both Article 2 of the U.C.C. and the
Restatement (Second) of Contracts.
The Shadow Code reveals goals of legal remedies for breach of
contract that have long been buried in the details, much as the principles of
the equitable remedy of restitution were revealed in the Restatement of
Restitution.14 Principles of restitution had been embedded in the common
law for centuries before the Restatement of Restitution was published in
1937. Using the element of unjust enrichment as the "common factor" to
unite the disparate rules governing this remedial approach, the Restatement
of Restitution brought to light principles lying in the shadows.15 The key
to understanding restitution lay in defining "unjust" and "enrichment." The
key to the surplus-based approach is distinguishing between "anticipated
surplus," the improvement in wellbeing the injured party would have
realized had the other performed as promised, and "actual surplus," the
improvement in wellbeing (often negative) resulting from the breach.
Just as the Restatement of Restitution followed its basic principle
16
with definitions of what "enriched" and "unjust" mean, 17 the Shadow Code
follows its basic principle in section 1 with only two explanatory sections,
defining in sections 2 and 3, respectively, the difference between
anticipated and actual surplus. The principle of lost surplus relies on a
comparison of the benefits and costs of contracting and recognizes a
definition of benefits as broad as the Restatement of Restitution, which
states that a person "confers a benefit upon another if he ... in any way
adds to the other's security or advantage."' 8  Costs may similarly be
defined as subtracting from the other's security or advantage. Sections 2
and 3 of the Shadow Code illustrate the broad range of costs and benefits
relevant to calculating lost surplus. With a general principle in section 1
and explanatory sections 2 and 3, the Shadow Code draws together hugely
14. RESTATEMENT OF RESTITUTION (1937).
15. See Mark P. Denbeaux, Restitution and Mass Actions: A Solution to the Problems
of Class Actions, 10 SETON HALL L. REv. 273, 289-96 (1979).
16. The basic principle of restitution is that "[a] person who has been unjustly enriched
at the expense of another is required to make restitution to the other." See RESTATEMENT OF
RESTITUTION § 1.
17. See id. § 1 cmts. a-c.
18. RESTATEMENT OF RESTITUTION § 1 cmt. b states that:
A person confers a benefit upon another if he gives to the other possession of or
some other interest in money, land, chattels, or choses in action, performs services
beneficial to or at the request of the other, satisfies a debt or a duty of the other, or
in any way adds to the other's security or advantage. He confers a benefit not
only where he adds to the property of another, but also where he saves the other
from expense or loss.
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disparate rules. It accomplishes a unification of legal remedies comparable
in scope to the objective of the Restatement of Restitution. The Shadow
Code spares future generations of law students, lawyers, and judges the
difficulty of applying different rules for cases involving sales of goods and
for other exchanges and, within the realm of sales of goods, different rules
for buyers and sellers in a multiplicity of factual contexts.
Part I of this Article discusses the failings of present approaches to
contract damages. It focuses on the unnecessary multiplicity of rules that
obscure the law's purposes and on conflicts in terminology that hamper the
law's straightforward application. Current translations of underlying
remedial principles into formulas for computing damages are unclear,
ambiguous, conflicting and fail to address all potential cases. While the
interest-based approach of the Restatement is without principled
justification and is redundant, the specific formulas in the U.C.C. are so
specialized in their application that the underlying rationale is lost, and the
court's time is wasted attempting to interpret the statute. The legal
literature on contract damages has produced a unifying theory for legal
remedies but has not translated that theory into a practical set of damage
rules. The computational approach of the Shadow Code -explicitly reflects
both the theory and its practical application.
In May 2003, the membership of the American Law Institute
approved proposed revisions to Article 2 of the U.C.C. 19 These revisions
resolve a few internal ambiguities and inconsistencies in the damages
sections, 20 but continue to treat buyers and sellers differently, and fail to
resolve the broader problems. The Shadow Code's simplicity and focus on
the underlying principle of ensuring the injured party obtains its lost
surplus eliminates the conflict.
In addition to inherent ambiguities and unnecessary complexity, there
is also inconsistent language employed in different sources of law. Courts,
the Restatement, the U.C.C., and the legal literature have adopted
19. See Amendments to U.C.C. Art. 2 - Sales, Proposed Final Draft, approved on May
13, 2003 [hereinafter Rev. U.C.C.].
20. For example, to parallel the provision in the cover section (§ 2-712), and to reflect
judicial interpretations, the revisions clarify that the failure of an aggrieved seller under
section 2-706 does not bar that seller from any other remedy. See Rev. U.C.C. § 2-706(7).
The new section (§ 2-708(l)(b)) clarifies when contract-market is calculated on a
repudiation, and the word "unpaid" has been deleted from section 2-708(1) as "superfluous
and misleading." See Rev. U.C.C. § 2-708(1) and cmt. 1(b). In addition, in the equation for
determining market damages, the revisions reverse the terms "market price" and "contract
price" to read "the difference between the contract price and the market price," to avoid
confusion, because "the contract price must be the larger number for there to be direct
damages." Rev. U.C.C. § 2-708(1) and cmt. 1(c).
[Vol. 55:495
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conflicting definitions of common terms, such as "incidental" and
''consequential" damages and "lost profit." "Consequential damages," for
instance, may include lost profits under the U.C.C., but never under the
Restatement. 2 1  "Incidental" may refer either to expenditures a party
anticipates incurring in order to earn a profit when the other party performs
as promised or to expenditures the injured party would never had incurred
but for the other party's breach.22 Courts regularly use conflicting
definitions of "profit," confusing "profit," "gross profit," "net profit," and
"clear profit.",23 The Shadow Code substitutes unambiguous labels for this
confusing and conflicting terminology.
Part II summarizes and critiques the attempts to reconcile and simplify
the modern understanding of contract damages. Most of them have been
theoretical (focusing on the underlying principles), 24 although there have
been attempts to develop new computational formulas. 25 These have either
been too simple to apply to the vast variety of contract cases or, if all
embracing, too unwieldy to be useful. The Shadow Code offers a
straightforward rule that applies to all cases.
Part III of this Article introduces the Shadow Code, which unifies the
strains of legal literature, reconciles approaches to different types of
contract breaches, and simplifies damage rules. It avoids the confusing
interest-based language of the Restatement and resolves the ambiguities
found in the U.C.C. The Shadow Code enables calculations incorporating
both the reliance and expectation measures of the Restatement and
recharacterizes the dominant remedial theory as one that restores "lost
surplus," rather than the one that awards expectations or net expectations.
26
There is only one basic rule in the Shadow Code and the principle
underlying the calculation of damages is explicit in that rule. The result
avoids the conflicting definitions employed in the two sources of law and
the impression that these two sources are engaged in different tasks, rely on
different premises, and have different underlying goals. Part III and the
21. See infra Part I.C.2.
22. Id.
23. See infra Part I.C. 1.
24. See infra Part II.
25. See infra text accompanying notes 112-130.
26. The term "net expectations" was first used by Lon Fuller and William R. Perdue,
Jr., The Reliance Interest in Contract Damages: 1, 46 YALE L.J. 52, 76 (1936) [hereinafter
Fuller & Perdue]. Professor David W. Barnes rewrote Fuller and Perdue's classic article
shifting the emphasis from the reliance interest to restoring the injured party's anticipated
improvement in its wellbeing and defended the "net expectations" interest as the interest
underlying modern contract damage rules. David W. Barnes, The Net Expectation Interest in
Contract Damages, 48 EMORY L.J. 1137, 1153 (1999).
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Summary also demonstrate, textually and mathematically, that applying the
Shadow Code generally yields results equivalent to application of the
U.C.C. and Restatement formulas. It discusses the few circumstances
where divergence from this equivalence (and from the well-recognized
goals of compensation) may occur. These include a minority position of
courts allowing an election of remedies under the U.C.C. which might
result in overcompensation, blanket denial of recovery of subjective and
emotional losses, undercompensation, and U.C.C. limitations on recovery
of consequential damages, which is unlikely to be of any practical import.
The Shadow Code appears as four sections. 27  Section 1 of the
Shadow Code (hereinafter SC § 1) offers a single, basic, black letter rule
for all contracting parties based on the improvement in wellbeing the
injured party would have realized from the other's promised performance.
Sections 2 and 3 (hereinafter SC § 2 and SC § 3, respectively) describe and
explain the components of the basic rule. Section 4 of the Shadow Code
(hereinafter SC § 4) codifies generally recognized limitations on contract
damages. Section 4 recognizes that claimed losses must not be too
speculative in either their existence or amount, that an injured party must
take reasonable steps to mitigate his or her losses, and that damages are
limited to those reasonably foreseeable. These limitations are well
established in contract law.28  The purpose of Section 4 is to clarify
ambiguities in the rules governing limitations on recovery and to describe
how damages calculated using the surplus-based approach account for
these limitations.
I. PROBLEMS WITH CURRENT CONTRACT DAMAGE FORMULAS
The motivation for drafting the Shadow Code is a lack of clarity and
focus in both the Restatement and U.C.C. contract damage provisions. The
27. A version of the Shadow Code complete with comments and illustrations in the
style of the American Law Institute's restatements can be found in David W. Barnes &
Deborah Zalesne, The Shadow Code, 56 S.C. L. REv. 93 (2004).
28. Damages generally must be established with reasonable certainty. See
FARNSWORTH, supra note 11, § 12.15, at 800; RESTATEMENT § 352. Damages must also be
reasonably foreseeable. See Hadley v. Baxendale, 156 Eng. Rep. 145, 151 (1854) (holding
that a party is entitled only to those damages that: (1) may "reasonably be considered...
[as] arising naturally, i.e., according to the usual course of things," from the contract breach
or (2) "may reasonably be supposed to have been in the contemplation of both parties, at the
time they made the contract, as the probable result of the breach of it"); RESTATEMENT § 351
(stating that loss may be foreseeable if it follows "in the ordinary course of events, or as a
result of special circumstances, beyond the ordinary course of events, that the party in
breach had reason to know"); U.C.C. § 2-715(2)(a) (limiting a buyer's consequential
damages to those the seller "had reason to know"). Finally, damages are not recoverable to
the extent they could have been reasonably mitigated. See RESTATEMENT § 350.
[Vol. 55:495
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problems in these sources of law lie in the Restatement's confusing and
unnecessary distinction between the expectation and reliance interests and
the U.C.C.'s separation of rules from the underlying compensation policy.
In addition, the Restatement, the U.C.C., and the legal literature on contract
damages adopt conflicting definitions of key concepts related to
computation of damages. The Shadow Code resolves these problems.
A. Restatement (Second) of Contracts
The fundamental problem with the Restatement is conceptual. Its
approach is based on a jurisprudential distinction between the expectation
and the reliance interests that is irrelevant to calculating damages for
contract breaches. 29  The interest-based approach contrasts an injured
party's expectation interest in being restored to the wealth position she
would have occupied had the contract been performed, with her reliance
interest in being restored to the wealth position she -would have occupied
had she never contracted at all. 30  The former allows recovery of lost
profits, while the latter allows recovery only for out-of-pocket
expenditures. 3' In practice, the law resorts to the latter only when proof of
lost profits is impossible. In theory, the interest never changes just because
the injured party has evidentiary problems. The straightforward approach
of the Shadow Code ensures that the injured party obtains its anticipated
improvement in wellbeing subject to its ability to prove those losses with
29. See RESTATEMENT § 344 (describing purposes underlying remedies for breach of
contract).
30. Compare id. § 347 ("[T]he injured party has a right to damages based on his
expectation interest") with id. § 349:
As an alternative to the measure of damages stated in § 347, the injured party has
a right to damages based on his reliance interest, including expenditures made in
preparation for performance or in performance, less any loss that the party in
breach can prove with reasonable certainty the injured party would have suffered
had the contract been performed.
Id. Taking into account the limitation in section 349, requiring deduction of any loss the
injured party would have suffered, the rules in practice collapse into a single principle that
the injured party is entitled to obtain so much of its expectation as can be proved with
reasonable certainty. See infra Part I.A.
31. This definition of the reliance interest is somewhat controversial. In a very
influential 1936 article on contract damages, Professors Lon Fuller and William Perdue, Jr.
described both an out-of-pocket measure of the reliance interest and a reliance interest that
included the value of opportunities forgone by an injured party in reliance on the promise of
the breaching party. See Fuller & Perdue, supra note 26, at 55. Modern contract theorists,
courts, and the Restatement typically refer to the reliance interest as including expenses
incurred rather than the profits associated with opportunities forgone. See Michael B. Kelly,
The Phantom Reliance Interest in Contract Damages, 1992 Wis. L. REV. 1755, 1757-58 &
nn.9-14 (1992).
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adequate certainty.32  The Restatement organizes its primary measure of
damages around the concept of lost value, which is properly interpreted as
lost revenue. The conceptual focus of the common law, however, is the
improvement in wellbeing the injured party failed to realize. The Shadow
Code abandons the reliance interest (and any reference to "interests") and
substitutes the concept of "surplus" for "value."
Damage provisions of the Restatement (Second) of Contracts are
based on a distinction between the expectation and reliance interests. This
dichotomy was undoubtedly influenced by Lon Fuller and William
Perdue's classic article on contract damages.33  The article purported to
articulate a jurisprudential preference for damages based on restoring the
injured party to its pre-contractual position by awarding out-of-pocket costs
incurred in reliance on the other's promise, 34 i.e., protecting the reliance
interest. Practical concerns, however, led Fuller and Perdue to adopt an
"opportunity cost" measure of reliance damages almost indistinguishable
from the expectation interest, 35 which focuses on the injured party's
anticipated position if the parties perform as promised. Nevertheless, the
Restatement and court opinions still refer to the "out-of-pocket" reliance
interest in cases where the injured party is unable to prove lost profits with
32. The "anticipated" improvement in wellbeing refers to the likely improvement in
wellbeing measured at the time the contract was to have been performed rather than the time
of formation, subject to conventional limitations on damages requiring foreseeability,
mitigation, and proof of the existence and amount of those losses with reasonable certainty.
See Barnes & Zalesne, supra note 27 § 2 cmts. a-f; infra Part III.C, SC § 4.
33. See Fuller & Perdue, supra note 26, at 52.
34. Id. at 53-54.
35. Fuller and Perdue came perilously close to eliminating any practical distinction
between the reliance and expectation interests. At one point, they argued that the reliance
interest includes both losses of an affirmative nature (expenditures of labor and money that
are wasted if the other does not perform) and opportunities forgone. Id. at 55. Referring to
those opportunities forgone as "gains prevented" by reliance on the other's promise, Fuller
and Perdue concluded that "there is nothing in the definition of the reliance interest itself
which would exclude items of this sort from consideration." Id. "Gains prevented" sound
suspiciously like the "lost profits" that are included in the expectation interest. Id. By
referring to opportunities forgone, Fuller and Perdue were including in the reliance measure
the injured party's lost profits on some potentially unknown, hypothetical, next-best
alternative. Lost profits on the breached contract are likely to be the best available estimate
of opportunities forgone and vice versa; one rarely can know because the latter often is
unidentifiable. Including opportunity costs in the reliance interest threatens to destroy the
distinction between it and the expectation interest. See Barnes, Net Expectation Interest,
supra note 26, at 1154 (discussing Fuller and Perdue's reliance measure). Professor
Michael Kelly identifies at least three distinct reliance interests in Fuller and Perdue's
article. Kelly, supra note 31, at 1768, 1759 (describing the various conflicting interests in
Fuller and Perdue's article and the lack of clarity in their definitions).
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reasonable certainty and is able to prove only the out-of-pocket expenses
incurred in the thwarted attempt to earn those profits.
36
There is no need to treat these cases of uncertain profit as recovery
based on the "reliance" as opposed to the "expectation" theory. As
Professor Barnes has elsewhere observed:
The court's limitation of damages to expenses incurred does not reflect a
lack of concern for the plaintiffs lost surplus. The law's interest in
placing the injured party in the position she would have occupied had
the other not breached does not suddenly change. Rather, the injured
party simply has failed to prove the full amount of her loss. The law's
goal is to get as close as possible to the award of net expectancy
consistent with its standards of proof. The latitude given to claimants in
proving lost profits evidences this concern. When it has been
established that a significant loss has occurred, the proof of damages
need not be mathematically precise; an approximation will suffice. The
award of costs incurred (expressed as reliance damages) in cases like
Security Stove is simply the closest provable approximation of the net
expectation amount.37
The out-of-pocket measure of reliance is simply an attempt to award
expectation subject to proof requirements. 38 The opportunity cost measure
36. The classic case on the reliance interest is Security Stove & Manufacturing Co. v.
American Railways Express Co., 51 S.W.2d 572 (Mo. Ct. App. 1932), in which a
manufacturer could not prove the quantum of profits lost due to an express company's
failure to deliver its stove on time for display at a sales exposition. The court limited the
plaintiffs recovery to expenditures the plaintiff had made in reliance on the express
company's promised delivery. Id. at 576. There are also examples of modem cases
recognizing a distinct reliance interest. See, e.g., Anderson Excavating & Wrecking Co. v.
Sanitary Improvement Dist. No. 177, 654 N.W.2d 376, 383 (Neb. 2002) (focusing on the
"out-of-pocket" reliance measure and rejecting injured party's claim for out-of-pocket
expenditures based on the reliance interest because the injured party had repudiated the
contract); Scott v. Grinnell Mut. Reinsurance Co., 653 N.W.2d 556, 562-63 (Iowa 2002)
(focusing on the "opportunity cost" reliance measure and rejecting claim for reliance
damage, including opportunity costs, where injured party did not offer proof of lost
opportunities); Thousand Dollar Club v. Krispinsky, 47 Pa. D. & C.4th 393, 408 (following
the approach of Security Stove and determining that the reliance interest was the appropriate
basis for computing damages because lost profits could not be proved).
37. Barnes, Net Expectation Interest, supra note 26, at 1153 (footnote omitted).
38. If the "out-of-pocket" reliance measure permitting an injured party engaged in an
unprofitable transaction to recover all of her costs, the reliance measure might allow such a
plaintiff to recover more under the reliance measure than the expectation measure, thus
destroying the equivalence of the measures. Contract damage rules, however, do not allow
this extra recovery. See Wartzman v. Hightower Prods., Ltd., 456 A.2d 82, 86 (Md. Ct.
Spec. App. 1983), holding that
[r]ecovery based upon reliance interest is not without limitation. If it can be
shown that full performance would have resulted in a net loss, the plaintiff cannot
escape the consequences of a bad bargain by falling back on his reliance interest.
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of reliance, occasionally recognized by some modem courts, 3 9 is similarly
an approximation of the expectation interest because of its recognition of
the injured party's right to the surplus it could have realized. There is no
need to recognize a distinct reliance interest where the resulting measures
are simply approximations for the expectation measure. The Restatement
recognizes that the reliance and expectation measures yield equivalent
damages in the case of a losing contract.
40
Where the breach has prevented an anticipated gain and made proof of loss
difficult to ascertain, the injured party has a right to damages based upon his
reliance interest, including expenditures made in preparation for performance, or
in performance, less any loss that the party in breach can prove with reasonable
certainty the injured party would have suffered had the contract been performed.
Id. (citing RESTATEMENT § 349). This rule restores the equivalence between the reliance
and expectation measures.
39. See, e.g., Scott, 653 N.W.2d at 562-63 ("Reliance damages are not designed to
rescue the plaintiff from the consequences of a bad bargain, but to compensate him for gains
unrealized as a result of the breaching party's conduct.").
40. See RESTATEMENT § 349; see also Bausch & Lomb, Inc. v. Bressler, 977 F.2d 720,
729 (2d Cir. 1992) (involving a manufacturing contract); Manganaro Bros. v. Gevyn Constr.
Corp. 610 F.2d 23, 23 (1st Cir. 1979) (involving a construction contract); United States v.
Mountain States Constr. Co., 588 F.2d 259, 261 (9th Cir. 1978) (involving a construction
contract); L. Albert & Son v. Armstrong Rubber Co., 178 F.2d 182, 190-91 (2d Cir. 1949)
(stating that recovery of reliance damages should be reduced by losses the aggrieved party
would have suffered had the contract been performed, but that the breaching party should
have the burden of proving the existence and amount of such losses); Kizas v. Webster, 532
F. Supp. 1331, 1332 (D.D.C. 1982) (involving an employment contract), rev'd on other
grounds, 707 F.2d 24 (D.C. Cir. 1983); Gruber v. S-M News Co., 126 F. Supp. 442, 446
(S.D.N.Y. 1954) (holding that damages of manufacturer of Christmas cards against
breaching distributor consists of costs of reliance, reduced by losses manufacturer would
have suffered from full performance); Mistletoe Express Serv. v. Locke, 762 S.W.2d 637,
638-39 (Tex. App. 1988) (holding that reliance damages of a freight company whose
contract was wrongfully cancelled should be reduced by losses the breaching party can
prove the freight company would have suffered); Dialist Co. v. Pulford, 399 A.2d 1374,
1376 (Md. Ct. Spec. App. 1979) (involving a franchise agreement). According to Professor
Farnsworth, the reliance measure of damages "rests on the premise that the injured party's
reliance interest is no greater than that party's expectation interest." See FARNSWORTH,
supra note 11, § 12.16, at 807. In the words of Fuller and Perdue, the rationale for this rule
is based on the mandate of section 1-106: "We will not, in a suit for reimbursement for
losses incurred in reliance on a contract knowingly put the plaintiff in a better position than
he would have occupied had the contract been fully performed." Fuller & Perdue, supra
note 26, at 79. See generally John E. Murray, Jr. & Harry M. Flechtner, The Summer, 1999
Draft of Revised Article 2 of the Uniform Commercial Code: What Hath NCCUSL
Rejected?, 19 J. L. & COM 1, 94 (1999) (explaining that in losing contracts where reliance
damages would exceed expectation damages, recovery of reliance damages is limited and
noting that restitutionary recovery has generally not been so limited); Harry M. Flechtner,
Enforcing Manufacturers' Warranties, "Pass Through" Warranties, and the Like: Can the
Buyer Get a Refund?, 50 RUTGERS L. REv. 397, 443 n.152 (1998) (noting that in losing
contracts, "courts will generally deduct from reliance damages the amount that the
breaching party can prove the aggrieved party would have lost on the contract," so that the
aggrieved party "will not be permitted to recover more on a reliance theory than under an
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Under the rule stated in section 349, the injured party may, if he
chooses, ignore the element of profit and recover as damages his
expenditures in reliance. He may choose to do this if he cannot prove his
profit with reasonable certainty. He may also choose to do this in the case
of a losing contract, one under which he would have had a loss rather than
a profit. In that case, however, it is open to the party in breach to prove the
amount of the loss, to the extent that he can do so with reasonable certainty
under the standard stated in section 352, and have it subtracted from the
injured party's damages. The resulting damages will then be the same as
those under the rule stated in section 347.41
The Restatement fails to apply this logic to profitable contracts.
Applying the "proof with reasonable certainty" requirement of section 352
in cases where profits were certain to exist but uncertain in amount, the
Restatement could simply have allowed recovery of out-of-pocket
expenditures under the expectation interest. The Restatement rules in
sections 347 and 349 do not recognize that the reliance interest is
unnecessary to the calculation of damages in either losing or profitable
contract cases. They unnecessarily complicate damage rules and obscure
the underlying goal. A unifying rule would have been that the injured party
is entitled to recover all amounts necessary to ensure his expectations
subject to the section 352 proof requirements for different elements of loss.
The Shadow Code embodies such a unifying approach.
B. Uniform Commercial Code Article 2
The U.C.C.'s remedial provisions reflect a supposedly "practical"
approach contrasting sharply with the Restatement's interest-based
approach. U.C.C. Article 2 sections 2-706 to 2-714 describe a different
rule for every circumstance in which contract breach might occur. There
are different rules for buyers and sellers;42 different rules for buyers who
expectation approach"); Eric G. Anderson, The Restoration Interest and Damages for
Breach of Contract, 53 MD. L. REv. 3, 13-14 (1994) (noting that "[e]xpectation... may
exceed reliance, but not vice versa" and that "the expectation interest is a ceiling on reliance
damages"); Mark Pettit, Jr., Private Advantage and Public Power: Reexamining the
Expectation and Reliance Interests in Contract Damages, 38 HASTINGS L. J. 417; 446-47 &
n.101 (1987) (explaining that generally reliance damages are capped at the amount of
expectation damages); Joseph M. Perillo, Restitution in the Second Restatement of
Contracts, 81 COLUM. L. REV. 37, 42 (1981) (stating "the injured party's recovery is
diminished by his prospective contract losses"). Restitutionary recovery has generally not
been so limited. See RESTATEMENT § 373 cmt. d; see also Joseph M. Perillo, Restitution in
the Second Restatement of Contracts, 81 COLUM. L. REv. 37, 42 (1981); Murray &
Flechtner, supra, at 94.
41. See RESTATEMENT § 349.
42. Damage rules applying to buyers are contained in U.C.C. sections 2-702 through 2-
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reject goods, buyers who accept defective goods, or buyers who arrange
substitute transactions when the seller breaches; 43 and different rules for
sellers who resell and those who do not, and those who cannot collect the
purchase price.44 Because these provisions are so specifically tailored to
various situations, it is impossible to keep in sight the underlying goal
articulated in section 1-106(1), which is to place the injured party in as
good a position as if the other party had fully performed. 5 The U.C.C.
rules suggest that buyers and sellers have different rights and remedies. In
addition, the theoretical connection between remedies for different kinds of
breaches is obscured by the welter of rules. Some buyers, for instance, are
entitled to damages based on market prices,46 while others obtain damages
based on the value of nonconforming goods received.a7 While all of these
rules are supposedly governed by the principle articulated in section 1-
106(1), there is no hint in the way the rules are. formulated that they are in
any way connected to the compensatory goal articulated in section 1-106.
The central failing of the U.C.C., then, is the lack of connection
among its damage rules and between each rule and its underlying
purpose.48 The lack of obvious relationship between the rules and the goal
710, while rules for sellers appear in sections 2-711 through 2-715.
43. Damages for buyers who rightfully reject goods are calculated according to a
formula in U.C.C. section 2-713, while recovery by buyers who accept defective goods is
governed by section 2-714.
44. Damages for sellers who resell are treated under U.C.C. section 2-706, for those
who do not resell under section 2-708, and for sellers who cannot collect the purchase price
under section 2-709.
45. U.C.C. § 1-106(1) cmt. a. (2001).
46. Id. § 2-713.
47. Id. § 2-714.
48. Numerous articles have been written about the ambiguities in Article 2's remedial
provisions and attempting to reconcile them with U.C.C. section 1-106(1). See, e.g., Roy
Ryden Anderson, Damage Remedies Under the Emerging Article 2 - An Essay Against
Freedom, 34 Hous. L. REv. 1065, 1066 (1997) [hereinafter Anderson, Damage Remedies]
(arguing that the Code's "egalitarian philosophy" of free election of remedies is
"substantially undercut by the strong compensation principle embodied in section 1-106 of
the U.C.C."); Roy Ryden Anderson, An Overview of Buyers' Damage Remedies, 21 UCC
L.J. 28 (1988) (discussing opposing interpretations of section 2-713); Robert Childres,
Buyer's Remedies: The Danger of Section 2-713, 72 Nw. U. L. REv. 837 (1978) (arguing
that, contrary to the mandate of section 1-103, section 2-713 fails to measure actual
damages); John D. Clark, The Proposed Revisions to Contract-Market Damages of Article
Two of the Uniform Commercial Code: A Disaster Not a Remedy, 46 EMORY L.J. 807, 809
(1997) (discussing the "occasional manipulation of U.C.C. section 1-106 by courts to limit
contract-market damages to lost profits"); Vincent A. Coppola, U.C.C. Section 2-708(2): A
Sheep in Wolf's Clothing?, 96 DICK. L. REv. 429 (1992) (addressing controversies arising
from ambiguities in provisions of the U.C.C. governing seller's remedies for repudiation or
non-acceptance and attempting to reconcile them with the underlying remedial purpose of
the code); Henry Gabriel, The Seller's Election of Remedies Under the Uniform Commercial
508
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of U.C.C. section 1-106(1) leads to conflicting terminology and confusion
among the courts when interpreting the rules. The drafters of the U.C.C.
helpfully created particularized damage rules to apply to different
circumstances in which buyers and sellers breach,49 but each seems to exist
in a vacuum, divorced from other damage rules and the reasons for them.
50
Two examples of controversies focusing on the dissonance between
interpretation of U.C.C. provisions and the remedial goal of section 1-106
illustrate these points.
1. Damages Based on Seller's Resale or Market Price?
A classic problem arising from the codification of alternative remedial
provisions is the opportunity to elect among them. For the Article 2
damage provisions, the explicit option to elect one over the other 51 may
conflict with the underlying goal of section 1-106. For instance, where a
buyer breaches and the seller resells the goods, there is some debate as to
whether the seller is limited to recovering damages under section 2-706
(based on the contract/resale price differential) or whether the seller can
still elect recovery under section 2-708(1) (based on the contract/market
price differential). An underlying assumption of section 2-706 is that
goods will generally be resold for their market value, in which case the
Code: An Expectation Theory, 23 WAKE FOREST L. REv. 429, 429 (1988) (illuminating
ambiguities in the Code through his argument in favor of free election of remedies even to
the extent it would permit the court to ignore an actual substitute transaction); David J.
Leibson, Anticipatory Repudiation and Buyers' Damages - A Look Into How the U.C.C.
Has Changed the Common Law, 7 UCC L.J. 272 (1975) (explaining differing interpretations
of section 2-713); Ellen A. Peters, Remedies for Breach of Contracts Relating to the Sale of
Goods Under the Uniform Commercial Code: A Roadmap for Article Two, 73 YALE L.J.
199 (1963) (discussing ambiguities and conflicts inherent in Article 2's damage provisions);
John A. Sebert, Jr., Remedies Under Article Two of the Uniform Commercial Code: An
Agenda for Review, 130 U. PA. L. REv. 360 (1981) (highlighting the lack of uniformity
among Article 2's damage sections); David Simon & Gerald A. Novack, Limiting the
Buyer's Market Damages to Lost Profits: A Challenge to the Enforceability of Market
Contracts, 92 HARv. L. REV. 1395, 1403 (1979) (outlining various arguments in favor of
contract market damages and others in favor of award of lost profits); George I. Wallach,
Anticipatory Repudiation and the UC.C., 13 UCC L.J. 48 (1980) (discussing various
interpretations of section 2-713).
49. See infra notes 173-79. In addition to a variety of rules for different circumstances,
U.C.C. section 2-714 allows damages to be "determined in any manner which is
reasonable."
50. This observation is hardly new to the literature on contract damages. See, e.g.,
Peters, supra note 48, at 204 ("[T]he interrelationship between the various remedies is often
left unnecessarily obscure in Article 2; a remedy which is permitted by one section appears
to be interdicted by another; conduct apparently harmless when viewed from the vantage of
one provision is fraught with danger when another section is considered.").
51. See U.C.C. §§ 2-710, 2-711 (2001) (listing various recovery options for injured
parties).
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damage award would be roughly the same under both sections. Markets
regularly fluctuate, however, and this assumption is only valid "if the
market for the goods is sufficiently stable to allow the seller to access it
before it changes."
52
The disparity between the two damage measures may arise where the
market price has fallen since contracting but starts to rise again shortly after
the breach. This creates a disparity between the market price at which the
seller could reasonably have resold and the (higher) price at which the
seller did resell. In such a case, the resale price is greater than the available
market price causing the damage award to be greater under section 2-
708(1) than section 2-706. For example, imagine that the contract price is
$700 and that, due to a falling market, the market price at which the seller
could have resold after the buyer's breach was $650. If a rising market
shortly thereafter allows the seller to resell at $675, should the seller be
entitled to resell at $675 and pursue the section 2-708 remedy? The section
2-708 damage measure, based on the contract/market price differential
($700-650) provides greater damages than the section 2-706 measure,
based on the smaller contract/resale price differential ($700-675).
Scholarly treatment of this question illustrates the consequences of
divorcing rules from their underlying purpose. Commentators in favor of
free election of remedies have argued that the drafters intended the contract
to be treated as a "separate and isolated legal event which should not be
influenced by other contractual arrangements made by the seller."53 This
permits recovery of greater damages based on the market price. The more
popular resolution of the issue, however, seems to be that the U.C.C. favors
damage awards based upon the actual substitute transaction (§ 2-706), not
upon a hypothetical estimate of relief (§ 2-708(1)), and section 2-708(1)'s
market formula should be used as an estimation of damages only in cases in
which a more exact measure of the seller's expectation is not possible.
54
52. See generally Anderson, Damage Remedies, supra note 47, at 1070.
53. Gabriel, supra note 47, at 429 (arguing for free election of remedies based on the
language of section 2-703, comment 1 to that section, and the U.C.C.'s legislative history);
see also Robert E. Scott, The Case for Market Damages: Revisiting the Lost Profits Puzzle,
57 U. CHI. L. REV. 1155, 1161 (1990) (summarizing and lending support for common law
court decisions "holding that any third party contract was irrelevant in computing the
injured party's loss"). Others favor the free election of remedies in order to prevent an
injured seller with good sales and negotiating skills from being penalized for making
another "good deal" with the new buyer. See, e.g., David H. Vernon, Expectancy Damages
for Breach of Contract: A Primer and Critique, 1976 WASH. U. L.Q. 179, 193.
54. See, e.g., Anderson, Damage Remedies, supra note 47, at 1070-71; JAMES J. WHITE
& ROBERT S. SUMMERS, UNIFORM COMMERCIAL CODE § 7.7, at 260-61 (4th ed. 1995).
Professors White and Summers have noted that the current U.C.C. and comments "bend in
the direction of permitting the seller to choose at will," but "stop well short of clearly
[Vol. 55:495
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Indeed, most cases decided under the current rules hold that a seller who
resells may not recover greater damages based upon market price.
55
Despite some consistency in judicial decisions favoring this approach,
the issue persists, as some courts continue to adhere strictly to the U.C.C.'s
allowance of election of remedies. These cases often arise where the seller
has resold the goods but has failed to comply with the requirements of
section 2-706.56 In such cases, the U.C.C. "relegates him to [damages]
provided in section 2-708." 57 But where the seller has resold for an amount
higher than the market price, damages under section 2-708(1) would be
more than the seller's actual losses, resulting in a windfall. In such cases,
courts will often limit the seller's section 2-708 damages to the amount that
could have been recovered under section 2-706.58 This logical, but strained
result is compelled by the U.C.C.'s competing principles, which force
courts to decide between preventing a windfall and strictly adhering to the
procedural requirements of section 2-706.59 Ultimately, neither reading is
explicit in the U.C.C., and each interpretation causes difficulties with
fundamental principles of the U.C.C.
authorizing this." Id. § 7.7, at 259.
55. See generally Anderson, Damage Remedies, supra note 47, at 1083 n.94 (citing a
string of cases in which courts denied recovery under section 2-708 where the seller had
resold the goods). An aggrieved seller who resells but seeks higher damages under section
2-708(1) may simply choose not to give the buyer proper notice under section 2-706 in an
attempt to bring the case under section 2-708(1). Most courts agree though, that a seller
who fails to comply with section 2-706 in bad faith should "not be permitted to recover 2-
708 damages that would put it in a better position than performance would have." WHITE &
SUMMERS, supra note 54, § 7.7, at 261.
56. See, e.g., Sprague v. Sumitomo Forestry Co., 709 P.2d 1200, 1206 (Wash. 1985)
(awarding an aggrieved seller market based damages under section 2-708 where seller
resold the goods, but failed to give the requisite notice of intention to resell the canceled
goods as required by section 2-706(3)).
57. U.CC. § 2-706, cmt. 2.
58. See, e.g., Coast Trading Co. v. Cudahy Co., 592 F.2d 1074 (9th Cir. 1979). In that
case, the court found that the plaintiff did not satisfy the elements of good faith and
commercial reasonableness required by section 2-706. Id. at 1080. Nonetheless, the court
concluded that the seller "should not be permitted to recover more under section 2-708(1)
than he could recover under section 2-706." Id. at 1081. Accordingly, the court awarded
the plaintiff damages under section 2-708(1), but "only up to the amount of damages that
could be recovered under Section 2-706." Id. at 1083.
59. See generally WHITE & SUMMERS, supra note 54, § 7.7, at 261. The issue is less
troubling in cases involving breaching sellers where the buyer covers. Like section 2-713
regarding sellers' remedies, section 2-711 gives an aggrieved buyer the choice of whether to
cover or recover damages under section 2-713. But unlike the seller's counterpart, the
comments to section 2-713 specifically provide that a buyer who has covered must base its
damages on the cover price. See U.C.C. § 2-713, cmt. 5 (stating that the section only
applies "when and to the extent that the buyer has not covered"). It remains unclear why
rules differ for buyers and sellers on this point.
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The Shadow Code compares an injured party's anticipated to actual
improvement in wellbeing based on reasonable substitute transactions,
thereby preventing windfalls. When an injured party arranges a reasonable
substitute transaction, losses are based on the facts of that transaction.
60
When the injured party does not arrange an available reasonable substitute
transaction, losses are based on the best evidence of what losses would
have been sustained had that transaction been arranged. 61 A seller who
benefits from or a buyer who is harmed by a rising market gets no windfall
because the surplus-based rules compare anticipated and actual gains. In a
parallel fashion, a seller who is harmed by or a buyer who benefits from a
falling market gets no windfall because of the focus on the anticipated and
actual position of the injured party.
2. Damages in Fixed Profit Cases
Another contested issue under the Article 2 damage provisions occurs
where there has been no substitute transaction but the contract/market
differential does not accurately reflect the aggrieved party's expectation of
gain. This issue typically involves fixed price supply contracts in a
fluctuating market. Where a contract calls for delivery of goods in a well-
developed market, typically the market will set the value of the seller's
performance. Where the injured party's improvement in wellbeing from
the transaction is fixed in advance, however, and therefore not dependent
on changes in market prices, the market price arguably is not an accurate
reflection of the injured party's loss. In such cases, some courts have
limited a buyer's recovery under section 2-713 or a seller's recovery under
section 2-708, despite those sections' unqualified language to the contrary,
on the basis of proof of limited expectations.
Suppose, for example, a buyer/reseller contracts to buy 2,000 steers
for $67 per steer from a seller and to sell 2,000 steers of the same
description on the retail market to a third party for $67.35 per steer,
guaranteeing him a profit of $700 ($.35 x 2,000 steers). The seller
breaches when the market price for steers increases to $70 per steer. The
buyer cannot reasonably. cover and seeks damages. To focus attention of
the fixed profit problem assume that the aggrieved buyer is released from
60. See Barnes & Zalesne, supra note 27, § 3 cmt. d, illus. 8, 9 and cmt. g, illus. 21, 23.
61. Id. § 3 cmt. d, illus. 8, 9 and cmt. g, illus. 22, 24. If an injured party takes a
deliberate risk by delaying the arrangement of a substitute transaction until beyond the time
after breach when it was reasonable to do so, damages are based on a reasonable substitute
transaction. See id. § 4 cmt. d. Gains and losses associated with risk-taking behavior are
allocated to the party taking the risks, rather than the breaching party, which seems
appropriate.
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its resale contract and has no liability for failing to perform that contract.
62
The question is whether such a buyer may recover damages of $6,000
based on the contract/market differential [($70-67) x 2,000], or whether her
damages should be limited to her lost commission of $700, an amount not
tied to the market.
This was roughly the scenario in H-W-H Cattle Co. v. Schroeder, in
which the court held that an award of market damages would have resulted
in a substantial windfall and damages should be limited to lost profits. 63 H-
W-H reflects the modem development in damage calculations, standing in
contrast to a longstanding "common law preference for market damages."
64
Widely approved by many commentators, 65 the reasoning in H- W-H and
other similar cases is based on the compensation principle and the notion
that recovery should be limited to the buyer's actual loss, rather than upon
the hypothetical substitute.
66
Despite the strong justification for preventing a windfall in
accordance with section 1-106's compensation principle, limiting
contract/market damages to an aggrieved party's expectancy interest is
contrary to the explicit language of the U.C.C. and has caused concern
among some commentators. 67  Indeed, several courts have declined to
62. This assumption is not unrealistic. Liability to a third party from breach of a
transaction dependent on the breaching party's performance of the contract in question is
added to damages otherwise recoverable, both under the U.C.C., see WHITE AND SUMMERS,
supra, note 54, § 6-4, at 207, and Barnes & Zalesne, supra note 27, § 3 cmt. f, illus. 20,
subject to traditional limitation on recovery to those losses that are foreseeable, unavoidable,
and ascertainable. See infra Part Iii.C, SC § 4. In H-W-H Cattle Co. v. Schroeder, 767 F.2d
437, 440 (8th Cir. 1985), the court said that the third party would at best only have broken
even on the cattle due to be delivered under the resale contract. In Allied Canners &
Packers, Inc. v. Victor Packing Co., 209 Cal. Rptr. 60, 62 (Cal. Ct. App. 1984), one third
party buyer released the injured party from its contract and the other never sued, presumably
because of a force majeure clause.
63. 767 F.2d at 439.
64. Scott, supra note 53, at 1159.
65. See, e.g., WHITE & SUMMERS, supra note 54, § 6-4 at 319-20; Peters, supra note 48,
at 257-59.
66. See, e.g., H-W-H Cattle, 767 F.2d at 439-40; Texas Co. v. Pensacola Mar. Corp.,
279 F. 19, 30 (5th Cir. 1922); Allied Canners, 209 Cal. Rptr. at 62; Pastor v. B. Lindner &
Bros., 253 N.Y.S. 184, 187 (lst Dep't 1931); Delmont Gas Coal Co. v. Diamond Alkali Co.,
119 A. 710, 711 (Pa. 1923); Foss v. Heineman, 128 N.W. 881, 883-85 (Wis. 1910).
67. Commentators have argued that a lost profits rule allocates market risks in an
inefficient and unstable way. See Clark, supra note 47, at 827. They also argue a policy of
limiting market damages may serve to "undermin[e] the incentives for parties to adequately
allocate market risks and perform their contractual obligations under unusual circumstances
that dramatically affect the market price." Id. See generally David Simon & Gerald A.
Novack, Limiting the Buyer's Market Damages to Lost Profits: A Challenge to the
Enforceability of Market Contracts, 92 HARv. L. REv. 1395, 1403 (1979), summarizing the
arguments of various commentators in favor of market damages as including:
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follow the reasoning in H-W-H Cattle and Allied Canners and awarded
contract-market damages rather than lost commission. 68  These cases,
noting the conflict between section 2-713, which allows recovery based on
market price, and section 1-106's compensation principle, have used rules
of statutory construction to resolve this conflict in favor of section 2-713,
the more specific provision. 69 Although there is some level of consensus
that these cases were not decided properly, 70 they illustrate the danger of a
system of damage rules that specify different formulas for different
circumstances and that are not explicitly related to the underlying
compensation principle. On this issue, the Shadow Code again adheres to
the resolution reflecting the goals of section 1-106.
Notably, the recent U.C.C. revisions fail to resolve the difficulties
identified above or to simplify the rules. 71 The Shadow Code does not
propose eliminating the helpful formulas currently appearing in sections 2-
706 through 2-714. It explicitly permits utilization of those approaches in
certain cases, with their interpretation to be consistent with the purposes of
section 1-106.72
C. Inconsistencies in Nomenclature
While calculation of damages for businesses by common law or
U.C.C. formulas often requires identification of what "profit" would have
been earned had there been no breach and what "costs" were incurred or
[T]he desirability of maintaining a uniform rule and of facilitating settlements; the
public interest in encouraging contract performance and the proper functioning of
the market; the prevention of defendant's unjust enrichment; the restoration of the
very 'value' promised to plaintiff; and the inherent difficulty and complexity of
proving actual economic losses not encompassed within the contract terms.
68. See, e.g., TexPar Energy, Inc. v. Murphy Oil USA, Inc., 45 F.3d 1111, 1114 (7th
Cir. 1995); Trans World Metals, Inc. v. Southwire Co., 769 F.2d 902, 909 (2d Cir. 1985);
Tongish v. Thomas, 840 P.2d 471, 473 (Kan. 1992); see also United States v. Burton Coal
Co., 273 U.S. 337, 338 (1927); Brightwater Paper Co. v. Monadnock Paper Mills, 161 F.2d
869, 872 (1st Cir. 1947); Stebel v. United States, 69 F. Supp. 221, 223 (Ct. Cl. 1947);
Friedman Iron & Supply Co. v. J.B. Beaird Co., 63 So. 2d 144, 149 (La. 1952); Floyd v.
Mann, 109 N.W. 679, 684 (Mich. 1906); Clinton Oil & Mfg. Co. v. Carpenter, 101 S.E. 47,
50 (S.C. 1919); Coombs & Co. v. Reed, 303 P.2d 1097, 1098 (Utah 1956).
69. See, e.g., Trans World Metals, 769 F.2d at 908 (noting that "nothing in the
language or history of section 2-708(2) suggests that it was intended to apply to cases in
which section 2-708(1) might overcompensate the seller").
70. See generally Anderson, Damage Remedies, supra note 47, at 1108-09.
71. The Article 2 Revision Study Group and the ABA Task Force recommended that
the comments clarify that the seller who has actually resold should be limited to section 2-
706 damages, and the buyer who has covered should be limited to section 2-712 damages.
The original revisions reflected the recommendation of the Study Group. The final
revisions, however, do not incorporate that change. See generally Rev. U.C.C.
72. See Barnes & Zalesne, supra note 27, § I cmt. b.
2005] A Unifying Theory of Contract Damage Rules 515
avoided by the injured party, neither term has an unambiguous meaning.
The Restatement is most clearly understood to award businesses the
difference between anticipated and actual profits. 73 The U.C.C. explicitly
focuses on "profit" in one of its most often applied formulas: § 2-708(2)
(Seller's Damages for Non-Acceptance or Repudiation).74 Yet courts offer
conflicting definitions of "profit." Similarly, though costs are often
described as "consequential" or "incidental," there is no agreement
between the Restatement and the U.C.C. on what these classifications
embrace. Consequential losses are defined differently in these two sources
of law, one definition including lost profit and the other referring only to
personal injury and property damages. "Incidental" is used by courts and
the legal literature to refer confusingly either to anticipated costs or
unanticipated costs incurred by the injured party. Neither the meaning of
profit nor the definitions of types of cost are clear. The Shadow Code
corrects these inconsistencies.
1. Inconsistencies in Terms Describing Lost Profit
For the purposes of damage calculations, "profit" properly refers to
the difference between the total benefits obtained from a particular contract
and the costs incurred in order to produce those benefits. Only those
variable costs, the costs that would not have been incurred but for the
contract, are deducted from total benefits derived from the contract to
determine profit. Accordingly, profit is correctly understood in the U.C.C.
as including overhead or fixed costs. 75 Overhead or fixed costs are those
that would have been incurred even had the party not engaged in the
particular contract in question; they are costs of running the enterprise as a
whole. Despite this general understanding, courts regularly refer to this
difference between revenues and variable costs as either "net profit" or
"gross profit."
Conflicting uses of the term "profit" abound and cannot easily be
dismissed. Parties frequently disagree about whether they are entitled to
73. See supra Part I.A.
74. U.C.C. § 2-708(2) (2001) provides:
If the measure of damages provided in subsection (1) is inadequate to put the
seller in as good a position as performance would have done then the measure of
damages is the profit (including reasonable overhead) which the seller would have
made from full performance by the buyer, together with any incidental damages
provided in this Article (§ 2-710), due allowance for costs reasonably incurred and
due credit for payments or proceeds of resale.
75. See, e.g., U.C.C. § 2-708(2) (2001) (stating that the calculation of damages for
contract breach begins with calculation of "the profit (including reasonable overhead)"); see
also FARNSWORTH, supra note 11, § 12.10, at 774.
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"gross" or "net" profits. This was the essence of the dispute in Automated
Medical Labs., Inc. v. Armour Pharmaceutical Co., where the court
concluded that the plaintiff was "entitled to gross profits, which includes
the net profit element and an overhead expense element." 76 Apparently,
"gross profits" are the same as "profits." But, in Starr Printing Co. v. Air
Jamaica, the court held that lost net profits were compensable but lost
gross profits were not, equating "net profits" to "profits" and apparently
using "gross profits" to refer to total revenues.77 Is "profit" greater, less
than, or equal to "net profit?" How does "profit" compare to "gross
profit?"
By the dictionary definition of "net," 78 net profit should be less than
"profit." For the court in Roth v. Speck, however, "net profit" was
something greater than revenues less variable costs.79 The court described
the difference between revenues brought in by a hairdresser and the salary
paid to a hairdresser under contract with the salon as the "net profit" to the
salon owner from the contract with the hairdresser. 80 But this "net profit"
included some variable costs (the additional costs of shampooing or
cleaning up after the hairdresser's clients, for instance) that must be
deducted from revenues to yield what the U.C.C. means by "profit."
Contrast the court's definition in Bead Chain Mfg. Co. v. Saxton Products,
Inc., which found that "'profit (including reasonable overhead)' is the
equivalent of net profit plus overhead." 81 For the Bead Chain court, profit
is something greater than net profit-greater by the amount of overhead.
There is equal confusion in the relationship between gross profit and
profit. The First Circuit, in Teradyne, Inc. v. Teledyne Industries, Inc.,
used the term "gross profit" to describe the difference between revenues
and variable costs, those identified with the contract to buy and sell a
transistor test system.82  Following customary usage, 83 "gross" suggests
some number greater than the "profits" to which the U.C.C. refers. But not
in Teradyne, where the court seems to mean "profit" in the U.C.C. sense,
76. 629 F.2d 1118, 1126 (5th Cir 1980).
77. 45 F. Supp. 2d 625, 634 (W.D. Tenn. 1999).
78. See WEBSTER'S SEVENTH NEW COLLEGIATE DICTIONARY 568 (1967) [hereinafter
WEBSTER'S DICTIONARY] (defining "net" as "remaining after the deduction of all charges,
outlay, or loss").
79. 126 A.2d 153 (D.C. 1956).
80. Id. at 155.
81. 439 A.2d 314, 320 (Conn. 1981).
82. 676 F.2d 865, 867 (1st Cir. 1982).
83. See WEBSTER'S DICTIONARY, supra note 78, at 368 (defining "gross" as "consisting
of an overall total without deductions").
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rather than including all revenue. 84 The court in Teradyne also used the
term "net profit," apparently to mean the difference between total revenues
associated with a contract and all costs, whether variable or fixed. 85 For
the Teradyne court, "net profit" is less than "profit," while for the Roth
court, "net profit" is something greater than "profit." Profit terminology is
further complicated by the Teradyne court's reference to the Third Circuit's
use of the term "clear profit," which has some connection, apparently, to
net profit in the sense of total revenues less variable costs less some portion
of fixed costs.
86
The U.C.C. refers to lost profit in the black letter of sections 2-706(6)
and 2-708(2) but usually relies on surrogates that may be easier to prove
from an evidentiary perspective, such as the difference between contract
price and market price, as in sections 2-708(1) (Seller's Damages for Non-
acceptance or Repudiation) and 2-713(1) (Buyer's Damages for Non-
Delivery or Repudiation). Appropriately interpreted, the surrogates work
fine. By contrast, the Restatement drafters compute damages by a formula
based on the "loss in value" due to breach. When "loss in value" is
understood to be the difference in total revenues due to breach rather than
profit, the Restatement approach works fine. When integrating various
approaches to damage computations, it would be useful to have a common
reference point, but the term "profit" is not suitable. This is especially true
since both sources of legal rules cover damages to consumers, who do not
have a "profit" to calculate in the usual sense of that word. Consumers and
businesses do, however, both hope for a "surplus," an excess of benefits
84. Teradyne, 676 F.2d at 868 (applying U.C.C. § 2-708).
85. Id. (referring to net profit and "clear" profit in a discussion of lost volume sellers).
"Net profit" can only be an artificial construct in the Teradyne usage. Because overhead
costs are fixed costs, they can only be arbitrarily assigned to different projects in which a
party is engaged. See, e.g., David S. Evans, The Antitrust Economics of Multi-Sided
Platform Markets, 20 YALE J. ON REG. 325, 345 n.73 (2003) (citing ALFRED E. KAHN, THE
ECONOMICS OF REGULATION, PRINCIPLES AND INSTITUTIONS 78 (1989) and W. Baumol et al.,
How Arbitrary is Arbitrary - or, Toward the Deserved Demise of Full Cost Allocation,
PUBLIC UTILITIES FORTNIGHTLY, Sept. 3, 1987, at 16-21).
86. Teradyne, 676 F.2d at 868 (citing Vitex Mfg. Corp. v. Caribtex Corp., 377 F.2d
795, 798-99 (3d Cir. 1967) (stating that "the price the businessman should charge on each
transaction could be thought of as that price necessary to yield a pro rata portion of the
company's fixed overhead, the direct costs associated with production, and a 'clear'
profit")). State court opinions confirm this interpretation. See, e.g., Texas Power & Light
Co. v. Barnhill, 639 S.W.2d 331, 335 (Tex. App. 1982) (referring to testimony by a
contractor who said that he normally bid into his contracts "10% 'clear' profit, that is, profit
after taxes, insurance, and hidden costs"); Messina v. Koch Indus., Inc., 267 So. 2d 221, 225
(La. Ct. App. 1972) (identifying the key issue as whether the 10% fixed fee in the contract
was "intended to be 'clear' profit or to include profit and some or all overhead expenses").
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over costs. The Shadow Code substitutes a concept of "surplus" that
applies equally to consumers and business entities.
2. Inconsistencies in the Meaning of "Consequential" and "Incidental"
as Applied to Costs and Losses
Consequential Losses. Because damage rules award both lost profits
and costs incurred, clear categories of the types of costs are essential for a
contract damages code. Unfortunately, confusion worse than that attached
to "profit" accompanies the use of terms describing costs incurred by the
injured party. The terms "consequential" and "incidental" damages are
central to both the Restatement and U.C.C. approaches to contract
damages. The Restatement allows recovery of "any other loss, including
incidental or consequential loss, caused by the breach." 87 U.C.C. section
2-715 allowed only buyers to recover consequential losses until the recent
revisions, which allow sellers to recover consequential damages, but only
from merchants.88  Setting aside the different treatment of buyers and
sellers, which has no parallel in the Restatement, it would be convenient if
the two sources of law defined consequential loss in the same way.
Unfortunately, consequential losses under the Restatement are only a
subset of those as defined by the U.C.C., and perhaps an insignificant
subset. According to Restatement section 347, consequential losses include
"such items as injury to person or property resulting from defective
performance."89 The illustration accompanying that section provides an
example of these tort-like injuries:
A leases a machine to B for a year, warranting its suitability for B's
purpose. The machine is not suitable for B's purpose and causes
$10,000 in damage to B's property and $15,000 in personal injuries. B
87. RESTATEMENT § 347. Measure of Damages in General:
Subject to the limitations stated in sections 350-53, the injured party has a right to
damages based on his expectation interest as measured by (a) the loss in the value
to him of the other party's performance caused by its failure or deficiency, plus
(b) any other loss, including incidental or consequential loss, caused by the
breach, less (c) any cost or other loss that he has avoided 'by not having to
perform.
88. Buyers were permitted consequential damages by U.C.C. section 2-715. There was
no comparable section for sellers and U.C.C. section 1-106(1) provided that "neither
consequential or special nor penal damages may be had except as specifically provided in
this Act or by other rule of law." The revision allows a seller to recover consequential
damages, but states that "[iun a consumer contract, a seller may not recover consequential
damages from a consumer." Rev. U.C.C. § 2-710(3).
89. RESTATEMENT § 347 cmt. c.
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can recover the $25,000 consequential loss in addition to any other loss
suffered. See Uniform Commercial Code § 2-715(2)(b).
90
The Restatement's reference to U.C.C. section 2-715(2)(b) suggests
an overlap with the U.C.C., but the overlap is far from complete. For the
U.C.C., consequential damages include both "(a) any loss resulting from
general or particular requirements and needs of which the seller at the time
of contracting had reason to know and which could not reasonably be
prevented by cover or otherwise;" and "(b) injury to person or property
proximately resulting from any breach of warranty." 91 While subparagraph
(b) refers to those tort-like injuries related to the breach, subparagraph (a)
includes a broad category of other types of losses not included in the
Restatement definition.
What is included in the U.C.C. definition of consequential damages,
but not included in the Restatement? Professors White and Summers'
leading commercial law treatise explains that the most common claim for
consequential damages under the U.C.C. involves lost profits. 92 Professor
Hawkland's multi-volume treatise is largely in accord, concluding that
"consequential damages do not arise within the scope of the immediate
buyer-seller transaction, but rather stem from losses incurred by the non-
breaching party in its dealings, often with third parties." 93 For buyers, the
difference between contract price and the price at which a good is resold to
a third party is an example of consequential damages, i.e., profit. Both
treatises emphasize the meaning of "consequential" contained in the first
subparagraph of that section, U.C.C. section 2-715(2)(a), including losses
other than the tort-like damages to person and property.
94
90. Id. § 347 cmt. c, illus. 4.
91. U.C.C. § 2-715 (2001).
92. WHITE & SUMMERS, supra note 54, § 6.5, at 211.
93. WILLIAM D. HAWKLAND, HAWKLAND UNIFORM COMMERCIAL CODE SERIES, § 2-
710:1 (2001).
94. The special treatment of lost profits in the U.C.C. is strange in its suggestion that
lost profits are unusual and outside the normal anticipation of breaching parties. In a case
where the defendant's insecticide damaged the plaintiffs blueberry crop, the court stated
that consequential damages were different from direct damages because they "do not arise
directly according to the usual course of things from the breach itself." Duyck v. Northwest
Chemical Corp., 764 P.2d 943, 946 (Or. Ct. App. 1988). According to the court,
consequential damages apparently occur as the result of special circumstances in particular
cases. Id. It cannot be that courts and the drafters of the U.C.C. think it unusual for buyers
to anticipate a profit from their dealings with sellers. Profit-making must be the
fundamental motivation for the exchange of goods. What these rule-makers want to
emphasize must be the requirement that lost profits resulting from breach must be
foreseeable. It is misleading to single out lost profits for special treatment under the
unforeseeability rule. The principle that recoverable losses include only those within the
contemplation of the parties, outlined in Shadow Code section 4, applies not only to lost
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Incidental Costs and Losses. The Restatement and the U.C.C. are in
accord on the definition of incidentals, but the legal literature's use of the
term "incidental" conflicts with both the Restatement and the U.C.C. The
Restatement uses "incidental" to include "costs incurred in a reasonable
effort, whether successful or not, to avoid loss" from breach.95 These are
expenses the injured party would not have incurred, but for the breach. The
U.C.C. is in accord, permitting sellers and buyers to recover incidental
damages.96 The examples in their definitions, comments, and illustrations
are all expenses incurred only because the other party breached, costs that
would not have been incurred had the other performed as promised. By
contrast, legal scholarly literature refers to "incidentals" as anticipated
costs that would have been incurred even if the other had performed but
were wasted as a result of breach.
Legal scholarship has been widely influenced by Fuller and Perdue's
article, The Reliance Interest in Contract Damages,97 which is the most
frequently cited98 and most influential article99 on contract damages. That
profits, but also to costs the injured party incurred in anticipation of the other's performance,
whether in order to perform herself or to enhance the value of the other's performance, as
well as costs the injured party did not expect to incur but incurred as a result of the other's
breach.
95. RESTATEMENT § 347 cmt. c.
96. For sellers, these are "any commercially reasonable charges, expenses or
commissions incurred in stopping delivery, in the transportation, care, and custody of goods
after the buyer's breach, in connection with return or resale of the goods or otherwise
resulting from the breach." See U.C.C. §2-710. For buyers, incidental costs "include
expenses reasonably incurred in inspection, receipt, transportation and care and custody of
goods rightfully rejected, any commercially reasonable charges, expenses or commissions in
connection with effecting cover and any other reasonable expense incident to the delay or
other breach." See U.C.C. § 2-715.
97. Fuller & Perdue, supra note 26.
98. See James E. Krier & Stewart J. Schwab, The Cathedral at Twenty-Five: Citations
and Impressions, 106 YALE L.J. 2121, 2146 app. 11 (1997). See also a series of such surveys
by Fred R. Shapiro, including The Most-Cited Articles from the Yale Law Journal, 100
YALE L.J. 1449, 1462 (1991); The Most-Cited Law Review Articles, 73 CAL. L. REV. 1540,
1545 (1985); The Most-Cited Law Review Articles Revisited, 71 CHI.-KENT L. REV. 751, 769
(1996).
99. See Krier & Schwab, supra note 97, at 2146 app. II. In his critical reflections on
Fuller and Perdue's article, Michael Kelly quotes scholars praising Fuller and Perdue's work
as the most significant or most famous article on contract law, discusses the influence of that
article on the Restatement (Second) of Contracts, and cites court opinions relying on Fuller
and Perdue's logic and scholarship extending and expanding Fuller and Perdue's theories.
Kelly, supra note 31, at 1757-58 & nn.9-14. In his article on teaching contract law,
Professor Frost states:
Among contract teachers and scholars, Fuller and Perdue's The Reliance Interest
in Contract Damages . .. is certainly an influential piece of legal scholarship.
Perhaps no single article in any legal discipline has had the pervasive impact on
the way the law is taught. Nearly every contracts casebook makes reference to the
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article uses the term "incidental" to refer to the collateral expenses a
contracting party incurs in order to enhance the profit he will make from
the contract in question. Fuller and Perdue used this term to distinguish the
enhancing costs ("incidental reliance") from necessary expenses ("essential
reliance"), the performance costs a contracting party incurs to fulfill her
contractual obligations.' 00  While distinguishing enhancing and
performance costs is analytically useful, these "incidental" costs are not
expenses related to breach included in either the U.C.C. or the Restatement
definitions. They are costs the injured party would have incurred even if
the other had not breached; they were, in fact, incurred in anticipation of
the other's performance. Nevertheless, legal scholars have adopted Fuller
and Perdue's terminology 101 and curtailing its use would reduce confusion.
The Shadow Code eliminates the conflicting language presently
complicating the discussion of contract damages by recognizing that the
loss for which compensation can be awarded is the loss of improvement in
one's wellbeing the injured party would have realized, less surplus.
10 2
These losses arise from reduced revenues or unreimbursed costs. To the
extent that losses come from revenues never obtained, the Shadow Code
recognizes a difference between anticipated and actual revenue. To the
extent that losses come from unreimbursed costs, the Shadow Code only
distinguishes between anticipated and actual costs, whether the costs are
incidental or consequential losses, however defined. Anticipated costs are
only those that would have been incurred had the other performed. Actual
costs are those actually incurred, whether anticipated or incurred only
because of the other's breach. In the Shadow Code, all categories of costs
are treated the same way in measuring damages. 1
03
work. Most casebook authors provide it as a central organizing feature of the
remedies section.
Christopher W. Frost, Teaching Important Contracts Concepts: Reconsidering the Reliance
Interest, 44 ST. Louis U. L.J. 1361, 1361 (2000). But see generally Barnes, Net Expectation
Interest, supra note 26 (dissecting the Fuller and Perdue article and demonstrating the errors
in each paragraph thereof).
100. Fuller & Perdue, supra note 26, at 78.
101. For recent examples, see Frost, supra note 98, at 1365 n.27 (describing how
discussing losing contracts leads to a discussion of the important distinction between
incidental and essential reliance); Paul L. Regan, Great Expectations? A Contract Law
Analysis for Preclusive Corporate Lock-Ups, 21 CARDOZO L. REv. 1, 35 (1999) (detailing
the types of damages awarded under contract law); and Michael T. Gibson, Reliance
Damages in the Law of Sales under Article 2 of the Uniform Commercial Code, 29 ARIZ. ST.
L.J. 909, 991-95 (1997) (reviewing the frequency with which courts award damages based
on incidental reliance).
102. The concept of "lost surplus" is explained in more detail in Part III.A. 1.
103. The concept of "breach-related cost" is explained in more detail in Part III.A.2.
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II. ATTEMPTS TO RECONCILE AND SIMPLIFY
For more than twenty years, scholars have explored the desirable
properties of fully compensatory contract damages. Much of the modem
work contributing to an appreciation of the underlying structure of contract
damage rules came from economists. In 1980, building on the work of
Professors Charles Goetz and Robert Scott, 104 Professor Steven Shavell
offered a general economic model of incentives created by various contract
damage rules. 10 5 He defined the expectation measure of damages as the
difference between the gross value of the other's performance to the injured
party less the value enjoyed by the injured party if the other party
defaults. 10 6 His mathematical model laid a foundation for the analysis of
incentives to make and break promises, to rely on promises, and to mitigate
losses. The formula was not particularly subtle, however, and failed to
capture the nuances of the variety of circumstances in which contracts are
breached. It was even less nuanced than the general formula in
Restatement section 347, which is also based on "gross value," total
revenue. To be fair, Professor Shavell's model was not designed, as the
Shadow Code formula in Shadow Code section 1 is, to be a universally
applicable tool for calculating damages.
In the 1980's, extensions of Professor Shavell's analysis brought the
abstract economic model closer to reality. Prominent among these articles
are those attempting a summary description of the expectation measure of
damages for the purpose of analyzing, as Professors Goetz, Scott, and
Shavell had done, the incentives created by contract damage rules. In
1985, Professor Robert Cooter modeled the damage remedy as a means for
restoring the injured party's lost revenues, 10 7 taking the same general
104. Charles J. Goetz and Robert E. Scott, Liquidated Damages, Penalties and the Just
Compensation Principle: Some Notes on An Enforcement Model and a Theory of Efficient
Breach, 77 COLUM. L. REV. 554 (1977). Professors Goetz and Scott defined just
compensation as an amount equal to the value of performance (reflecting the language of
RESTATEMENT § 347), but allowed in the analysis for partial performance and compensation
sufficient to place the injured party on a graphical "quasi-performance curve," which
indicated, in theory, amounts of compensation for various degrees of performance by the
breaching party that would leave the injured party as well off as full performance. Id. at
558, 565. Their model implicitly recognized, in a graphic rather than formulaic manner, the
need to develop a general model applicable to a variety of circumstances, including partial
performance, in which contract breaches may occur.
105. Steven Shavell, Damage Measures for Breach of Contract, 11 BELL J. EcON. 466
(1980).
106. Id. at 473.
107. Robert Cooter, Unity in Tort, Contract, and Property: The Model of Precaution,
73 CAL. L. REV. 1 (1985) (evaluating rules for efficient precaution taking, which, in the
contract law context, means minimizing the expected losses from breach).
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approach as Professor Shavell and the Restatement. Professor Cooter
seemed to recognize, however, that restoring lost profits was the ultimate
goal: "Full compensation restores [the injured party's] profits to the level
that would be achieved in the event of performance, so setting D
[Damages] = b(yr) [the total benefit from the injured party's reliance on the
other's promise], may be interpreted as awarding expectation damages."
' 10 8
Rather than obliquely approaching lost profits through lost revenues, the
Shadow Code takes a more straightforward approach, focusing directly on
the lost surplus. The Shadow Code is explicitly organized around that goal.
The purpose of a 1985 article by Professors Robert Cooter and Melvin
Eisenberg was "to develop certain theoretical and actual measures of
contract damages."' 1 9 They started with the statement that "protection of
the expectation interest requires an award such that the injured party will
achieve the level of satisfaction (if a consumer) or profits (if a firm) that
would have been achieved if the contract had been performed."' 10 This
statement advanced the development of a universally applicable rule in two
ways. First, it explicitly recognized that, for firms, it is the anticipated
level of profits that is the focus of damage rules. Second, it recognized that
consumers have analogous expectations of improving their wellbeing,
"achieving a level of satisfaction." The Shadow Code treats consumers and
firms as both contracting in order to increase their "surplus."'
1
Translating this principle into methods for computing damages,
Professors Cooter and Eisenberg developed five formulas, which they said
described damage calculations in almost all cases."12  Three of these
reflected the expectation interest: the "substitute price" formula, 113 which is
analogous to the spirit of U.C.C. formulas based on the difference between
contract price and market price (§§ 2-708(1) and 2-713(1)) and perhaps the
actions for resale and cover (§§ 2-706 and 2-712); the "lost surplus"
formula,114 which is analogous to the spirit of a seller's action for the price
(§ 2-709); and the "diminished value" formula, 115 which is analogous to a
buyer's damages for breach with regard to accepted goods (§ 2-714). In
their analysis, each of their formulas could be applied to both buyers and
108. Id. at 50.
109. Robert Cooter & Melvin A. Eisenberg, Damages for Breach of Contract, 73 CAL.
L. REv. 1432, 1434 (1985).
110. Id. at 1438.
111. See infra note 132 (defining and explaining consumer and producer surplus).
112. Cooter & Eisenberg, supra note 108, at 1443 (acknowledging that additions to
and subtractions from the basic formulas are necessary to fit individual cases).
113. Id. at 1439.
114. Id. at 1439-40.
115. Id. at 1442.
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sellers. This feature constructively recognized the underlying similarities
between buyers' and sellers' remedies. The other two formulas reflected
different interpretations of the reliance interest, 116 but also recognized the
fundamentally similar treatment of buyers and sellers." 7  While the
literature had not yet developed a single, universally applicable formula,
Professors Cooter and Eisenberg's work contributed recognition of the
focus on lost profit, of similar interests of consumers and producers, and of
the symmetry of treatment of buyers and sellers.
Mainstream contract law scholars have also considered the
simplification of contract damage rules. In various editions of his treatise
on contract law, Professor E. Allan Farnsworth has presented a profit-based
formula for suppliers' damages. 18 This formula recognizes the right of a
supplier to recover lost profits plus its incurred cost of performing less
losses avoided plus other losses. 119 An abbreviated discussion of this
approach also appears in the 2001 edition of his casebook with Professors
William Young and Carol Sanger.120  This formula is reminiscent of the
Restatement section 347 general formula in its structure, though it
appropriately makes the transition from "loss in value"' 121 to lost profit. As
the Shadow Code illustrates, focusing on lost profit (or lost surplus)
facilitates an understanding of the relationship of the universal damage rule
to the underlying goal. The surplus-based approach championed by the
Shadow Code makes the connection more explicit than either Professor
Farnsworth's approach or that of the Restatement. While playing around
116. Id. at 1440-42. The "opportunity cost" measure reflects the interpretation of
Fuller and Perdue's reliance measure, which recognized that the injured party implicitly
declined other wellbeing-enhancing opportunities when it contracted with the breaching
party. Fuller & Perdue, supra note 26, at 71-75. This opportunity cost measure may also be
interpreted as an approximation of recovery under the expectation measure of damages. See
supra, text accompanying notes 35-39. The "out-of-pocket" measure reflects the modern
understanding of the reliance interest reflected in the RESTATEMENT § 349. Id.
117. Sellers are often (though not necessarily) expecting the buyers' performance to
consist of money and other financial instruments and buyers expect the sellers' performance
to consist of an exchange of goods and services. The exchanges are symmetric, however,
and the providers of goods and services may be considered buyers of financial instruments
while the providers of financial instruments may be viewed as sellers. Both have a similar
interest in having the other perform as promised, may have opportunities to arrange
substitute transactions in the market, and are concerned with both partial and defective
performance.
118. See, e.g., FARNSWORTH, supra note 11, § 12.10, at 768-74 (discussing alternative
formulas for suppliers' damages).
119. E. ALLAN FARNSWORTH, WILLIAM F. YOUNG, & CAROL SANGER, CASES AND
MATERIALS ON CONTRACTS 470-71 (6th ed. 2001).
120. Id. at 469-71.
121. See supra Part L.A (describing the Restatement's approach to measuring
expectation damages).
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with these general formulas may provide accurate measurements of
expectation damages, it is never clear in their exposition how these
approaches apply to vast numbers of damages cases involving, for instance,
part performance of contracts, breaches of warranty, or cases where the
injured party arranged a substitute transaction through cover or resale to
minimize losses.
Recognition of the right to recover both lost profits and costs, as
Professor Farnsworth's formula does, is fundamental. A most basic error
in calculating contract damages lies in concluding that an injured party may
recover lost profit or may recover costs incurred but not both. This
conclusion is seductive. One might think that recovering lost profits, in the
sense of total revenues less variable costs, is sufficient to make injured
parties whole. The anticipated profit was what the party expected to take
home, after all, and that is what she takes home. The problem is that when
she gets home, there are collection agents at home, waiting for her to pay
the costs she incurred. After paying those costs, there may be nothing left.
The misperception lies in the idea that the injured party gets to "take home"
the entire damage award.
Perhaps thinking of lost profit (or lost surplus) as analogous to "take-
home pay" will prevent the misconception about recovering both lost
surplus and costs incurred. Take-home pay is that portion of one's wages
or salary that is left over after deductions for costs one is obliged to pay,
such as income and social security taxes. If an employer fails to pay a
worker one week, the employer cannot make up for it by simply giving the
worker cash equal to the take-home pay. Unless the employer also makes
the appropriate tax payments, the worker will be required to pay for those
obligations out of the take-home pay, leaving her with less disposable
income than she would otherwise have had. What the injured party hoped
for when contracting was to realize enough benefits (salary before
deductions in our analogy, revenues for a person in commerce) to pay off
those costs (deductions in our analogy) and have the profits (take-home
pay) left over.
Courts have occasionally made this mistake, concluding that a party
injured by contract breach would be overcompensated if awarded both lost
profits and costs incurred. These opinions reflect neither the intent of the
Restatement or U.C.C. rules, nor the underlying logic of expectation
damages. Smith v. Onyx Oil & Chemical Co. illustrates the potential for
confusion. 122 In that case, Smith contracted to sell a chemical product that
122. 218 F.2d 104 (3d Cir. 1955).
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Onyx promised to develop. 123 When Onyx repudiated the contract, Smith
sued for lost profits and for more than $3,000 in expenses incurred in
getting ready to perform. 124 With respect to those expenses, the court held,
"This, we think, is not recoverable. If he has the profit he was to make, had
the contract been performed, he cannot also have the expenses to which he
was put to make that profit."' 125  Without award of incurred expenses,
however, the injured party will not fully realize his anticipated surplus.
In 1998, Professor Barnes explored the connection between specific
rules of damages described in the Restatement and Article 2 of the U.C.C.
and claimed to have developed a universally applicable formula that was an
extension of the lost profits plus costs incurred approach suggested by
Professor Farnsworth. 126 Professor Barnes claimed that the formula could
be used to calculate expectation damages under any circumstances in which
a contract might be breached. 127 While a generous commentator described
the underlying theory as "detailed and nuanced,"'128 applying the model
was admittedly cumbersome and unwieldy. It required arranging nine
pieces of data into five modules, which captured the variety of potential
contracts cases. 129  While Professor Barnes's work identified the
connections between damage rules for different kinds of breaches, its
complexity rivaled the U.C.C. 13 ° The universality of the resulting rule,
however, laid the foundation for the Shadow Code.
III. THE SHADOW CODE
The Shadow Code completes the evolution towards a single unified
rule governing recovery of expectation damages for breach of contract. It
does so by restating that measure in surplus-based terms and by adopting
123. Id. at 107.
124. Id. at 110-12.
125. Id. at 112.
126. Barnes, Anatomy of Contract Damages, supra note 4, at 464.
127. Id. at 468.
128. Joseph M. Perillo, Misreading Oliver Wendell Homes on Efficient Breach and
Tortious Interference, 68 FORDHAM L. REv. 1085, 1092 n.41 (2000).
129. Barnes, Anatomy of Contract Damages, supra note 4, at 464 (demonstrating how
contract damage rules create incentives to breach contracts only.when doing so maximizes
societal wealth).
130. To be fair, Professor Barnes's purpose was not to derive a useful means for
measuring damages. The nature of his formula was dictated by his goal of evaluating
previous scholars' claims that the expectation measure of damages provides an incentive for
party's to breach only when it is efficient to do so. By reflecting all possible cases of
contract breach where the expectation measure might be applied, he was able to prove
mathematically that the incentive was consistent for all types of factual circumstances in
which parties breach. See Barnes, Anatomy of Contract Damages, supra note 4 at 488-89.
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language that eliminates present inconsistencies. That single rule is
contained in Shadow Code section 1. Shadow Code section 1 is based on
an injured party's recovery of its lost surplus. This approach covers buyers
and sellers, consumers and producers, merchants and non-merchants under
a single rule. Because restoring lost surplus is equivalent to placing the
injured party in the position it would have occupied had the other not
breached, the lost-surplus approach explicitly implements the goal of full
compensation articulated in U.C.C. section 1-106.
Sections 2 and 3 of the Shadow Code are definitional. The amount of
lost surplus in Shadow Code section 1 depends on a calculation of
anticipated and actual benefits received and costs incurred. Accordingly,
these two sections elaborate on how anticipated and actual surpluses,
respectively, are calculated in the vast variety of cases that can occur.
131
The language of these sections eliminates the current inconsistencies
between the U.C.C., the Restatement, and the legal literature on contract
damages.
Section 4 of the Shadow Code codifies the traditional limitations on
damage recovery well known to contract remedies. It does not purport to
change the law, but rather to clarify the meaning of those limitations.1
32
A. Abandoning Confusing Terminology
The first step in describing the principles lying in the shadow of
current contract damage rules is to abandon inconsistent and unclear
language. For years, courts have grappled with the conflicting use of
common terms such as "incidental" and "consequential" damages and "lost
profit" found in the different sources of law, not to mention the divergent
judicial interpretations, even within a given source of law. The Shadow
Code substitutes unambiguous labels for this confusing and conflicting
terminology.
1. Lost Profit, Value, and Surplus
The Shadow Code proposes a modest substitution of the word
"surplus" for profit. Both describe the difference between a party's total
revenues or benefits and that party's variable costs, but "surplus" avoids
the legacy of confusion created by conflicting uses of "profit." Using
"surplus" instead of "profit" has the further advantage of permitting the
131. See generally the comments and illustrations in Barnes & Zalesne, supra note 27.
132. The comments and illustrations to the Shadow Code demonstrate how traditional
damage limitations affect the computation of damages under the surplus-based approach.
Id.
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language of the Shadow Code to be as applicable to consumers, whom we
do not think of as earning a profit from their exchanges, as to business
enterprises. Shadow Code section 1 bases all damage calculations on lost
surplus:
§ 1 General Rule for Recovery of Damages for Breach of Contract
When a contract is not fully performed, an injured party may
recover damages as measured by the lost surplus, which is the
difference between anticipated surplus and actual surplus.
Economists use the term "surplus" to refer to the improvement in
wellbeing a party realizes from engaging in exchange. 133 It captures the
essence of people's fundamental reason for engaging in exchange, making
themselves better off. Any party to an exchange is willing to incur only so
much cost in order to obtain the benefits the exchange will produce. To the
extent that the costs fall short of that maximum, the party earns a surplus.
For a buyer, the costs include the contract price as well as other expenses
necessary to produce the benefit. In a commercial context, the buyer's
benefits may be from reselling or producing something from the material
that was the subject of the contract. The seller's benefit is often simply the
contract price, though perhaps also goodwill, while her costs may just be
the expense of producing the goods. The concept of surplus, then,
measures the improvement in wellbeing associated with contracting; the
benefits less the costs. The appeal of the idea of surplus is that it captures
the essence of people's fundamental reason for engaging in exchange, to
make themselves better off. 1
34
133. In economics, the consumer's surplus is the difference between the maximum a
buyer would be willing to pay and the amount she must pay to obtain the product or service.
For a seller, the producer's surplus is the difference between the minimum a seller is willing
to accept and the amount she is paid. For a buyer, the maximum she is willing to pay
measures the total benefits she would derive from the exchange. If she pays that maximum,
the benefits equal the costs and she realizes no net improvement-the surplus is zero. For
any price below that maximum, subtracting the amount she does pay leaves a measure of her
improvement in wellbeing. The minimum a seller is willing to accept is a measure of the
total benefits (or cost savings) he realizes by declining the exchange and either keeping and
using the good himself or refraining from supplying the good. For any price above that
minimum, subtracting the minimum price from the actual price measures the seller's
surplus, the improvement in wellbeing he realizes from exchange. The economic concepts
of producer and consumer surplus are discussed in all major law and economics texts. See,
e.g., RICHARD A. POSNER, ECONoMIc ANALYSIS OF LAW 278 (4th ed. 1992); ROBERT
COOTER & THOMAS ULEN, LAW AND ECONOMICS 301 (1988); DAVID W. BARNES & LYNN A.
STOUT, CASES AND MATERIALS ON LAW AND ECONOMICS 362-68 (1992). See also David W.
Barnes, The Meaning of Value in Contract Damages and Contract Theory, 46 AM. U. L.
REV. 1, 7, 14-16 (1996).
134. Illustrations of what the surplus means in a wide variety of contract damages
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The term "surplus" relates to both consumers and producers in the
way profit describes the excess of benefits ("revenues" only in the
commercial context) over variable costs. Even if the term "profit" were
clearly defined, it would not capture the surplus consumers anticipate from
their contracting. Consumers injured by contract breach are as entitled as
entrepreneurs to be placed in as good a position as the promised
performance would have done. This is illustrated by the famous "hairy
hand" case, applying a measure of damages equal to the difference between
the value of a "perfect" hand and the value of the hand "delivered" by the
surgeon.1 35 This holding recognizes the consumer/patient's right to realize
his anticipated improvement in wellbeing, which the concept of "surplus"
captures.
The holdings in other cases may similarly be phrased in terms of
ensuring that the consumer recovers her lost surplus. The court in Deitsch
v. Music Co., found that the plaintiffs were entitled to their lost surplus
resulting from the diminished value of the wedding reception when the
band hired for the occasion failed to perform. 136 The increased pleasure
derived from a wedding with a live band rather than the record player to
which they resorted less the increased expenses of the live band is the
residuum to which the surplus refers. In Pullman Co. v. Willett, the court
held that a honeymooning couple was entitled to lost surplus resulting from
the diminished value of their honeymoon train trip when sleeping
accommodations promised by the Pullman Company were unavailable.
137
The total benefits of a sleeping car train trip less the greater price of the
sleeping berth ticket, when compared to the total benefits of a coach car
train trip less the price of a coach ticket reflects the lost surplus. It would
not be conventional to describe the anticipated gain by these consumers as
lost "profits." The term surplus captures the balance of benefits over costs
for both consumers and business people, whether the case involves the sale
of goods or services.
Conceptually, the foundational principle of ensuring that the injured
party obtains her surplus requires recognition of all elements of benefit and
cost. Recall that the Restatement of Restitution states that a person
"confers a benefit upon another if he... in any way adds to the other's
security or advantage"'138 and that costs may similarly be defined as
cases are provided in the comments and illustrations in Barnes & Zalesne, supra note 27, §§
1-3.
135. Hawkins v. McGee, 146 A. 641, 644 (N.H. 1929).
136. 453 N.E.2d 1302, 1304 (Ohio 1983).
137. 7 Ohio C.C. (n.s.) 173, 174 (1905).
138. RESTATEMENT OF RESTITUTION § 1 cmt. b.
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subtracting from the other's security or advantage. 139 Anticipated benefits
that are subjective in nature, such as the benefit of a sleeping berth or a live
band in the preceding cases, are benefits that theoretically should be
included in computations. Similarly, emotional harms (mental distress) are
breach-related costs that subtract from the injured party's advantage.
Claims for subjective benefits are often dismissed as unforeseeable or
uncertain in amount, consistent with Shadow Code section 4.140 Claims for
mental distress could similarly be denied on one of these bases or on the
principle that such claims can easily be feigned. 14 1 But the surplus-based
approach can still be applied even if there were a blanket prohibition on
consideration of subjective benefits or emotional harms.
142
Notorious cases in which the subjective benefits to the injured party
are denied are those involving substantial performance and "economic
waste."' 143 In these cases, generally involving construction contracts, courts
139. See supra text accompanying note 18.
140. The inability to recover uncertain or unforeseeable subjective losses is addressed
by other remedial rules allowing for liquidated damages and specific performance. See
Goetz & Scott, supra note 103 (arguing that the remedy of specific performance is
preferable to a damage remedy where the injured party attaches values to the other's
performance that are not reflected in a market). Application of the specific performance
remedy in this context demonstrates that some exceptions to the general rule awarding
expectation damages promote, rather than lead away, from the foundational principle of
compensation. See, e.g., Cohen, supra note 4 (arguing that many contract damage rules are
contrary to the purported goal of compensation based on expectations and identifying cases
where courts give less than fully compensatory damages).
141. Fear of fraud is often cited as the reason for denying recovery of emotional
distress damages in tort in the absence of an accompanying indicia of reliability, such as
bodily injury or property damage, or a breach of contract where emotional harm is
particularly foreseeable, such as mishandling of corpses and negligent transmission of death
notices. See W. PAGE KEETON ET AL., PROSSER AND KEETON ON THE LAW OF TORTS 361-63
(5th ed. 1984). Emotional harm is treated similarly in tort and contract cases. See ARTHUR
LINTON CORBIN, 11 CORBIN ON CONTRACTS: DAMAGES 369 (Interim ed. 2002) (referring to
cases involving carriers, telegraph companies, and innkeepers).
142. The approach of the Shadow Code is applicable regardless of whether recovery of
certain categories of loss are categorically denied or severely limited. Recovery of
prejudgment interest and attorneys' fees, for example, is limited, reflecting valid principles
that conflict with full compensation. See DAN B. DOBBS, LAW OF REMEDIES: DAMAGES-
EQUITY-RESTITUTION 246-47, 285-86 (2d ed. 1993) (describing awards of prejudgment
interest only when amounts are liquidated or ascertainable and awards of attorneys fees as
designed to sanction parties who have a duty to protect the injured party from litigation
costs). We are not devoted to full compensation as an inviolable principle and we have no
intention of arguing here against any departure from it. The purpose of drafting the Shadow
Code is to create a rule that is founded on the same goal as in the Restatement and the
U.C.C., that is easier to apply than the welter of rules in those sources, and that avoids
conflicting definitions and interpretations.
143. Where performance under the contract is defective, rather than just unfinished,
and the cost to complete requires undoing some of the work already done, the total cost to
remedy the defect may be greater than the loss in value. It is said that this excess expense
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apply the rule that "if the builder can meet the test of substantial
performance, the builder can recover on the contract the full price, less any
damages to which the owner is entitled because of breach. These damages
are based sometimes on the loss in value to the owner and sometimes on
the cost to the owner to remedy the defect." 144 Loss in value is generally
approximated by diminution in market price, which may be nominal, even
where the loss in value to the injured party "is not fully reflected in the
diminution in market price." 145 Award of the less generous diminution in
market price is "sometimes defended on the ground that allowing the more
generous measure, based on cost to remedy the defect, would result in
'economic waste."' 146  It is a stunted view of economics that rejects as
valuable a party's bona fide subjective loss. If the substantial performance
rule is truly based on an excess of cost to remedy over benefits to be
realized, damages could still be based on the subjective benefits to be
realized, rather than market value, subject to the well-recognized
requirement that the subjective benefits be verifiable.
To the extent that the substantial performance rule relies on market
value even where the subjective value is ascertainable, it is a conscious
departure from the foundational compensatory principle. Perhaps the rule
is really based on the difficulty of discerning whether the injured parties'
claims of injury disproportionate to market value are bona fide. 147 Without
leads to "economic waste." In those cases, generally, if "the cost of completion is grossly
and unfairly out of proportion to the good to be attained," then the court will award damages
based on the difference in value (which may be nominal) rather than the cost to complete
(which may be great). Jacob & Youngs, Inc. v. Kent, 129 N.E. 889, 891 (N.Y. 1921);
FARNSWORTH, supra note 11, § 12.13, at 789; see also RESTATEMENT § 348(2)(b) (stating
that cost of completion is only recoverable where such cost "is not clearly disproportionate
to the probable loss in value to [the injured party].").
144. FARNSWORTH, supra note 11, § 12.13, at 788-90. Courts consider several factors
to determine which measure of damages to apply, including: (1) the extent of harm the
injured party has suffered from the breach; (2) the extent of forfeiture the breaching party
will suffer from having to cure the deficiency; and (3) whether the breach was willful or the
breaching party failed to observe standards of good faith. See Jacob & Youngs, Inc., 129
N.E. at 890-91 (describing factors used to determine which measure of damages to apply).
145. FARNSWORTH, supra note 11, § 12.13, at 790.
146. Id.
147. For example, commentators have suggested that the reason the plaintiff in Jacob
& Youngs requested pipe specifically manufactured by the Reading Company was to
guarantee that the pipe would be wrought iron quality as opposed to steel. See RICHARD
DANZIG, THE CAPABILITY PROBLEM IN CONTRACT LAW 122 (1978). Evidently, there were
four companies at the time manufacturing wrought iron pipe, all of which brands "were of
the same quality and price." Id. at 121. Witnesses testified that "[t]he manufacturer's name
would make absolutely no difference in pipe or in price." Id. Since the plaintiff did get
wrought iron pipe quality, the harm from the deviation from contract specifications is
questionable. A more likely explanation for the litigation, Danzig reasons, may have been
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regard to the basis of the exception, however, the surplus-based rule can
recognize the limitation. It is no different in principle from any policy-
based reason for limiting liability, such as rules limiting recovery of
attorneys' fees and costs.
Focusing directly on lost surplus is sensible from economic,
philosophic, and moral perspectives.1 48  It is sensible to imagine that
people contract in order to improve their wellbeing, their level of
satisfaction or profits. The anticipated surplus measures the improvement
they would have realized had the other not breached. Compensating for
lost surplus protects people from disappointment and demoralization that
might discourage contracting behavior. 149 Restoring lost surplus is social
wealth maximizing, in the sense that it encourages performance whenever
the exchange allocates resources to their most valuable uses. 150  The
surplus-based rule also acknowledges free will, by presuming that people
would want to protect their anticipated improvement in wellbeing and
establishing a default rule ensuring that improvement. 15 1 Aside from being
a more straightforward approach to damages and being more focused on
the purpose for awarding damages, the underlying objective is sensible and
appealing.
2. Consequential and Incidental Costs
To overcome the inconsistencies between the Restatement and the
U,C.C. with respect to consequential damages, these losses may be lumped
together under the label of "breach-related costs."'152 Breach-related costs
to express "other dissatisfactions in his relationship with Jacob and Youngs." Id. at 123.
148. See generally Barnes, Net Expectation Interest, supra note 26, at 1157-70.
149. Id. at 1159-60 (citing Frank I. Michelman, Property, Utility, and Fairness:
Comments on the Ethical Foundations of "Just Compensation" Law, 80 HARV. L. REv.
1165, 1214 (1967) (describing demoralization costs as including both the immediate
disappointment and the future disruption to cooperation in society by people disturbed by
the thought that they have been or might in the future be subject to unfair treatment)).
150. See generally Barnes, Anatomy of Contract Damages, supra note 4 (evaluating
incentives created by contract damage rules for parties to breach only when it is efficient to
do so).
151. See Barnes, Net Expectation Interest, supra note 26, at 1160 (describing the "will
theory" of contract as suggesting that the court's role in enforcing contracts is to reflect the
subjective will of the parties at the time of contract formation) (citing CHARLES FRIED,
CONTRACT As PROMISE: A THEORY OF CONTRACTUAL OBLIGATION (1981) (describing and
updating the will theory of contract) and MORTON J. HORWITZ, THE TRANSFORMATION OF
AMERICAN LAW 1780-1860 (1977) (describing the development of contract doctrine and the
period when the will theory was dominant)).
152. See generally Barnes, Anatomy of Contract Damages, supra note 4 (discussing
the relationship between breach-related costs and damages); Barnes & Zalesne, supra note
27, § 3 cmt. f (describing and illustrating breach-related costs).
[Vol. 55:495
2005] A Unifying Theory of Contract Damage Rules 533
are costs the injured party would not have incurred had the other party not
breached. The term includes the tort-like personal and property damage of
the Restatement's definition 153 and of the U.C.C. section 2-715(b). The
definition of breach-related costs cannot include lost profits or expenses the
injured party expended in anticipation of the other's performance. Lost
profits are losses, but are not "costs," which are out-of-pocket expenses
incurred by the injured party. Anticipated expenses are costs, but are not
breach-related costs, because the injured party would have incurred them
even if the other had not breached.
Adoption of the term "breach-related costs" also resolves an
inconsistency around use of the term "incidental costs" in the legal
literature. 154  The Restatement and the U.C.C. are in accord on the
definition of incidentals. The Restatement uses "incidental" to include
"costs incurred in a reasonable effort, whether successful or not, to avoid
loss" from breach. 155 These are clearly breach-related costs, expenses the
injured party would not have incurred, but for the breach. The U.C.C. is in
accord, permitting sellers and buyers to recover incidental damages.
156
These examples are all breach-related costs. Because legal treatment of the
two types of costs are identical, 157 there is no particular utility to
distinguishing between them in the black letter rules. It is, nevertheless,
analytically useful to distinguish between these unanticipated breach-
related costs and costs that would have been incurred even if the contract
had been performed. 158  When the Shadow Code refers to "costs," it
includes all types of out-of-pocket expenses.
B. Damage Computations Under the Shadow Code
The Shadow Code, designed to ensure recovery of an amount
sufficient to guarantee the injured party her anticipated level of
improvement in wellbeing, focuses on the difference between anticipated
and actual surplus. Using general cost language, Shadow Codes sections 2
and 3 elaborate on the calculation of lost surplus:
153. See RESTATEMENT § 347 cmt. c (defining consequential damages).
154. See supra text accompanying notes 96-102.
155. RESTATEMENT § 347 cmt. c.
156. See U.C.C. §§ 2-710 (seller's incidental losses) & 2-715(1) (buyer's incidental
losses) (2001).
157. Both types of breach-related costs are, for instance, subject to the traditional
limitations on damages. See infra Part III.C, SC § 4.
158. Examples of breach-related costs and their treatment in computation of damages
appear in comments and illustrations in Barnes & Zalesne, supra note 27.
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§ 2 Anticipated Surplus
The anticipated surplus of an injured party is the difference
between the benefits that party would have received as a result of
the contract and costs that party would have incurred in relation to
the contract had the contract been fully performed.
§ 3 Actual Surplus
The actual surplus of an injured party is the difference between the
benefits the injured party received because of the contract and
losses the injured party suffered because the contract was not fully
performed.
Either of these surpluses may be positive or negative. In a simple case
of contract breach, where the injured party had incurred costs related to the
contract (paid the contract price or produced the good or service) but not
received the promised performance, the actual surplus will be negative-
costs incurred but no benefits received. In a partial or defective
performance case, the actual surplus may be negative if the performance
falls seriously short of complete or positive if only slightly defective.
Anticipated surplus is generally a positive amount, since people expect to
be made better off by their exchanges. Consistent with well-recognized
contract damage principles, 159 this "anticipation" is the improvement in
wellbeing the party would have obtained had the other performed.
Similarly, anticipated costs and profits are those that would have resulted
from full performance by .both parties, not those that either party "hoped
for" or "expected" at any previous time. The anticipated surplus is the
improvement in wellbeing the injured party reasonably anticipated at the
time of performance, not at the time of contract formation. Thus, there
may be losing contracts, in which the anticipated surplus is negative despite
the optimism of the injured party at the time of contract formation. The
general language of the Shadow Code accounts for all of these possibilities.
The anticipated costs associated with a particular contract may be of
two types: performance costs, 160 those costs a party was obliged to incur by
the contract's terms, and surplus-enhancing costs, 16 1 those investments a
159. See, e.g., supra note 5.
160. Fuller and Perdue described these as "essential reliance" costs. Fuller & Perdue,
supra note 26, at 78. Their terminology was adopted by the RESTATEMENT § 349 cmt. a.
"The term good performance cost seems more straightforward and helps distinguish these
costs from other expenses incurred in reliance on the other's promise." Barnes, Net
Expectation Interest, supra note 26, at 1147 n.31 (citation omitted).
161. The term "surplus enhancing reliance" appears to have been used first by Robert
Cooter and Melvin A. Eisenberg. See Cooter & Eisenberg, supra note 109, at 1465. In their
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party is not obliged to make, but incurs in order to increase its anticipated
surplus. This distinction appears nowhere in the black letter of the Shadow
Code as these costs are treated in an equal fashion by the law.
162
C. Limitations on Recovery and Equivalence of the Shadow Code
The only addition to the one general rule in Shadow Code section 1
and the two explanatory provisions in sections 2 and 3 is a codification of
generally recognized limitations on damage recovery:
§ 4 Losses Compensable
Losses are compensable only to the extent that:
(1) the injured party could not have avoided them using
reasonable methods
(2) the parties contemplated or could reasonably have foreseen
that the losses would result from the breaching party's
failure to perform; and
(3) the fact of the loss and the amount of the loss are provable
with reasonable certainty.
This codification does not change current law limiting recovery of
damages. 163  The Shadow Code is substantively equivalent to the
Restatement and U.C.C. approaches, giving the same result in virtually
every case while eliminating the conflicts identified in this Article. It
preserves the convenient methods of proof inherent in the diverse sections
of the U.C.C.'s Article 2. It recognizes one difference between the Revised
U.C.C. and the common law of contract damages related to the ability of
injured parties to recover lost revenues from future contracts with third
parties. This difference is relatively unimportant in practical terms. It also
illustration, a boat buyer might buy special navigational equipment in advance of delivery of
the boat so that he can depart on a lengthy voyage as soon as the boat is delivered, rather
than delaying his pleasure. They use the term "to refer to discretionary reliance by a
contracting party that is undertaken to increase the surplus over and above what he would
enjoy had he simply done what was explicitly or implicitly required under the contract." Id.
A detailed analysis of the role of surplus enhancing costs and performance costs in the
computation of contract damages can be seen in Barnes, Anatomy of Contract Damages,
supra note 4, at 426-36.
162. The distinction between performance and surplus-enhancing costs is of
computational utility and employed in the comments and illustrations to the Shadow Code,
reminding those applying the formula of different types of compensable expenses. See
Barnes & Zalesne, supra note 27, § 3 cmt. e.
163. Note, however, the discussion of election of remedies immediately following.
While this section does not alter the substantive law, the comments and illustrations to this
section indicate how the damage limitations articulated in it affect the computation of
damages awards. See id. § 4 and comments.
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addresses the election of remedies issue in the U.C.C. by adopting an
approach that closely adheres to the compensation goals of U.C.C. section
1-106.
1. Revised U. C. C. Limits on Recovery of Lost Surplus
The difference between the common law and the Revised U.C.C.
arises from a provision in the latter that denies sellers recovery from
consumers of any lost surplus beyond that included in the contract price. 
164
Under the common law, any loss of surplus beyond that included in the
contract price would be recoverable only if reasonably foreseeable (as
required in Shadow Code section 4(2)). A consumer is unlikely to foresee
any additional loss of surplus, so the explicit U.C.C. limitation is unlikely
to make a practical difference. The Revised U.C.C. recognizes that sellers
are unlikely to recover additional lost surplus, even from merchants. 165
This difference does not affect the underlying design of the surplus-based
approach reflected in the Shadow Code.
2. Election of Remedies
Neither the U.C.C. nor the common law requires an injured party to
arrange a substitute transaction to minimize losses associated with the
other's breach. In the U.C.C. context, this means that a buyer is not
required to cover and a seller is not required to resell in order to mitigate its
losses. 166 The law imposes no such duty on the injured party. 167 However,
164. The revision allows a seller to recover consequential damages, but states that "[i]n
a consumer contract, a seller may not recover consequential damages from a consumer."
Rev. U.C.C. § 2-710(3).
165. See id. § 2-710 cmt. 2 (noting that "[s]ellers rarely suffer compensable
consequential damages.").
166. The revised U.C.C. provides that an aggrieved buyer is not obligated to cover, and
is free to recover damages based on the market price under section 2-713 where he chooses
not to cover. Id. § 2-712(3) "Failure of the buyer to effect cover within this section does not
bar him from any other remedy." Id. Before the reccnt revisions, it was not clear whether
sellers were obliged to arrange substitute transactions to minimize losses due to breach,
since no parallel provision existed for sellers. The revisions clarify that "[f]ailure of a seller
to resell under this section does not bar the seller from any other remedy." Id. § 2-706(7).
167. See RESTATEMENT § 350 cmt. b.
b. Effect offailure to make efforts to mitigate damages. As a general rule, a party
cannot recover damages for loss that he could have avoided by reasonable efforts.
Once a party has reason to know that performance by the other party will not be
forthcoming, he is ordinarily expected to stop his own performance to avoid
further expenditure. See Illustrations 1, 2, 3 and 4. Furthermore, he is expected
to take such affirmative steps as are appropriate in the circumstances to avoid
loss by making substitute arrangements or otherwise. It is sometimes said that it
is the "duty" of the aggrieved party to mitigate damages, but this is misleading
because he incurs no liability for his failure to act. The amount of loss that he
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if an injured party does not mitigate by availing itself of a reasonable
substitute transaction, avoidable losses are deducted from its recovery.
While this is explicit in the Restatement, 168 the U.C.C. recognizes that the
market price at which the buyer could have covered or the seller could have
resold can be used as a proxy to estimate what losses were reasonably
avoidable. 169 The election of remedies approach allows the injured party to
choose the market price proxy even if it actually arranged a reasonable
substitute transaction and no proxy is needed. 170  The more popular
approach is one that looks to the actual (reasonable) substitute transaction
as the best estimate of what compensation is necessary to place the injured
party in the position it would have occupied had the other performed, as
U.C.C. section 1-106 requires. 171  The Shadow Code reflects this more
popular approach by recognizing that the best estimate of both lost
revenues and costs actually incurred is found in the reasonable substitute
transaction, if there was one, and in other evidence, such as the market
price, if no substitute transaction occurred. Reliance on the market price as
evidence must always reflect the underlying principles of full
compensation. 1
72
could reasonably have avoided by stopping performance, making substitute
arrangements or otherwise is simply subtracted from the amount that would
otherwise have been recoverable as damages.
Id. (emphasis added).
168. Id.
169. See id. cmt. c.
In the case of the sale of goods, this principle [limiting recovery to avoidable
losses] has inspired the standard formulas under which a buyer's or seller's
damages are based on the difference between the contract price and the market
price on that market where the injured party could have arranged a substitute
transaction for the purchase or sale of similar goods. See Uniform Commercial
Code §§ 2-708, 2-713. Similar rules are applied to other contracts, such as
contracts for the sale of securities, where there is a well-established market for the
type of performance involved, but the principle extends to other situations in
which a substitute transaction can be arranged, even if there is no well-established
market for the type of performance. However, in those other situations, the
burden is generally put on the party in breach to show that a substitute transaction
was available, as is done in the case in which an employee has been fired by his
employer.
Id.
170. See supra text accompanying notes 53-59.
171. Id.
172. An award based on the difference between the market price and the contract price
where an aggrieved party has not covered or resold is, in principle, an acceptable measure of
lost surplus, where the market price is a good estimate of the cost of or revenue associated
with a reasonable substitute transaction. A simple-minded comparison that ignores the
underlying compensation principle is inappropriate. For example, a buyer may choose not
to cover because she has changed her mind and no longer wants or needs the contract goods.
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3. Equivalence of the Shadow Code
As the next section demonstrates, the Shadow Code's articulation of
the surplus-based approach yields damage awards equivalent to each
U.C.C. Article 2 section as well as section 347 of the Restatement. To
promote this equivalence and to promote ease in proving damages, it is
permissible to refer to either the U.C.C. or Restatement formulas. When an
injured party, for whatever reason, is unable or unwilling to reveal actual or
anticipated costs, revenues, or surplus, for instance, the formulas for
damage recovery in sections 2-706 through 2-715 of the U.C.C. are
available to establish damages otherwise calculated by the surplus-based
rule. When properly understood, those specific formulas always give a
result consistent with the mandate in section 1-106 and the surplus-based
approach. In addition, other definitions, rights, and obligations established
in the damages sections of Article 2 supplement the Shadow Code, to the
extent they do not conflict.
SUMMARY
The Shadow Code eliminates ambiguities in interpreting and
reconciling the array of damage rules in the U.C.C. and Restatement, and
offers a unified approach to computing damages closely connected to the
foundational compensatory principle. It avoids ambiguities by focusing on
the extent to which the injured party has improved its wellbeing. It avoids
conflicting definitions and expands the applicability of rules by substituting
"surplus," the measure of that improvement, for "profit" and recognizes
that an injured party either incurs anticipated costs (of performance or
surplus-enhancing) or breach-related costs. It unifies damage rules by
offering a single rule that applies to all cases of contract breach.
A simplistic application of the rule granting the difference between the contract price and
the market price would overcompensate the buyer because it fails to reflect the change in the
improvement in her wellbeing the buyer would have realized had the seller performed. The
U.C.C.'s availability of market based damages may encourage buyers, based on market
fluctuations, to speculate as to the best time to cover, rather than encourage the more
commercially reasonable behavior of covering as soon as reasonably possible. See
Anderson, Damage Remedies, supra note 47, at 1099. Certainly the drafters did not intend
for section 2-713 to "offer an incentive ... which would influence buyers not to [cover],"
WHITE & SUMMERS, supra note 54, § 6.4 at 198, but its very existence often achieves such a
result. The Shadow Code's approach recognizes the market price as an estimate of the
characteristics of a reasonable substitute transaction and gives no advantage to the -buyer
who does not cover, an incentive already minimized by the requirement that the non-
covering buyer must sue to recover greater losses than had it arranged a substitute
transaction. Because the market price is viewed as an estimate, it must be scrutinized to see
if it is a reasonable estimate. This reduces the injured party's opportunity to speculate.
[Vol. 55:495
2005] A Unifying Theory of Contract Damage Rules 539
The surplus-based approach to damages simplifies understanding of
the relationship between rights and remedies and the computation of
damages. In every case, the surplus-based damage rule compares the
surplus the injured party would have obtained but for the other's breach to
the surplus the injured party actually realized:
Lost Surplus = Anticipated Surplus - Actual Surplus.
Whether anticipated or actual, the surplus is the difference between
benefits (or revenues) and costs:
Anticipated Surplus = Anticipated Benefits -Anticipated Costs.
Actual Surplus = Actual Benefits - Actual Costs.
The actual surplus may, of course, be positive (when partial or
defective performance produces a net benefit) or negative (as where the
injured party incurs costs without realizing any benefit). The anticipated
surplus may also be positive (as when the other's performance would have
produced a profit for the injured party) or negative (in the case of losing
contracts). The surplus-based rule has sufficient flexibility to apply to all
cases.
If either buyer or seller actually incurs costs or realized benefits
different in amount from those he or she would have incurred had the other
performed, those are also reflected in the difference between anticipated
and actual benefits and costs. Benefits may be realized from the other's
partial or defective performance, one's own expenditures in performance,
or from one's own surplus-enhancing expenditures. Costs may include the
costs of performance, of surplus-enhancing expenses, or unanticipated
breach-related costs as shown in Table 1.
Table 1: Sources of Benefit and Cost
Sources of Benefit Sources of Cost
Other's Performance Own Performance
(anticipated or actual for partial (anticipated or actual)
or defective performance cases) Own Enhancing Expenses
Own Performance (anticipated or actual)
(actual, where one's Own Breach-Related Costs




investments have salvage value)
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The relationship between the surplus-based damage rule and
prominent U.C.C. provisions can easily be seen by comparing the approach
for simple cases. In some cases, such as where breach is induced by a
change in market prices after contracting, damages are simply the
difference between anticipated and actual costs or anticipated and actual
benefits. The lost surplus for the injured buyer of a standardized good, for
instance, may simply be the difference between the contract price the buyer
would have paid had the seller performed as promised, and the market price
at which the buyer may obtain identical substitute goods after breach:
Buyer's Lost Surplus =
Anticipated Benefits -Contract Price -
(Actual Benefits -Market Price).
If identical goods are reasonably available, the anticipated and actual
benefits are the same and lost surplus is simply the difference between
market (or cover) and contract prices, reflecting the foundation for U.C.C.
sections 2-71273 and 2-713.74
173. Section 1 of the Shadow Code can be expressed as three equivalent formulas:
Damages =
Anticipated Surplus -Actual Surplus -
(Anticipated Benefits - Anticipated Costs) - (Actual Benefits - Actual Costs) =
(Anticipated Benefits - Actual Benefits) - (Anticipated Costs - Actual Costs).
For section 2-712, "cost of cover" for buyers is an actual cost, "contract price" for buyers is
an anticipated performance cost. The difference between cost of cover and contract price
reflects losses from the buyer's increased cost of obtaining goods, a difference between
anticipated and actual performance costs. Surplus may also be lost in the case of cover
because of either or both increased cost of processing inferior substitute goods and reduced
benefits due to covering with a less than perfect substitute (as in a purchase for resale).
There may also be breach-related costs classified as incidental or consequential losses.
To translate this section, recognize that lost revenues are a component of consequential
damages and all other parts of the U.C.C. formula refer to changes in costs. The difference
between "cost of cover" and "contract price" is Anticipated Performance Cost - Actual
Performance Cost. "Incidental losses" are breach-related costs, a component of actual costs.
"Consequential losses" that are not losses in revenues or benefits received are increased
enhancing costs (Anticipated Enhancing Costs - Actual Enhancing Costs). Where the cost
of cover is less than the contract price, as in partial cover cases, "expenses saved," reflects
the difference between anticipated and actual performance costs. "Expenses saved" may
also reflect reduced enhancing costs. In the translation below, the change in the benefits or
revenues received is reflected in the difference between anticipated and actual benefits. The
changes in costs (the difference between anticipated and actual costs) come from (a) the
difference between cover and contract price, (b) differences in enhancing costs, (c) expenses
saved, and (d) breach-related costs. Thus, for section 2-712: Damages = Cost of Cover -
Contract Price + Incidentals + Consequentials - Expenses Saved. In translation, Damages =
(Anticipated Benefits - Actual Benefits) - (Anticipated Performance and Enhancing Costs -
Actual Performance, Enhancing, and Breach-Related Costs), equivalent to the formula
[Vol. 55:495
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Buyer's Lost Surplus =
(- Contract Price) - (- Market Price) = Market Price - Contract Price.
The lost surplus for a seller, for instance, may simply be the difference
between the contract price for which the seller would have sold had the
buyer performed as promised, and the market price at which the seller
transacts with another:
Seller's Lost Surplus =
Contract Price - Anticipated Costs - (Market Price - Actual Cost).
If the seller can resell without any additional costs, anticipated and
actual costs are equal and lost surplus is simply the difference between
contract price and market (or resale) price, reflecting U.C.C. sections 2-
706175 and 2-708.176
above.
174. As for section 2-712, lost benefits in section 2-713 are captured by consequential
damages. All other parts of the formula capture changes in cost, from the difference in
market and contract prices, incidentals, other consequentials, and expenses saved. Thus, for
section 2-712: Damages = Market Price - Contract Price + Incidentals + Consequentials -
Expenses Saved. In translation, Damages = (Anticipated Benefits - Actual Benefits) -
(Anticipated Performance and Enhancing Costs - Actual Performance, Enhancing, and
Breach-Related Costs), equivalent to the formula above.
175. For sellers pursuing damages under section 2-706, the "contract price" should be
understood as an anticipated benefit and the "resale price" as an actual benefit. "Expenses
saved" are the difference between anticipated and actual performance and enhancing costs.
Actual costs may, therefore, be either actual performance or enhancing costs or breach-
related costs and section 2-706 can be rewritten as: Damages = Contract Price - Resale Price
+ Incidentals - Expenses Saved. This translates to the Shadow Code rule as follows:
Damages = Anticipated Benefits - Actual Benefits + Breach-Related Costs - (Anticipated
Performance and Enhancing Costs - Actual Performance and Enhancing Costs). This can be
rearranged as: Damages = (Anticipated - Actual Benefits) - (Anticipated Costs - Actual
Costs), equivalent to the general formula above.
176. For sellers pursuing damages under section 2-708(1), "contract price" should be
understood as an anticipated benefit. "Market price" measures actual benefits that could
reasonably have been obtained by the seller. "Expenses saved" are the difference between
anticipated and actual performance and enhancing costs. Actual costs may, therefore, be
either actual performance or enhancing costs or breach-related costs. Thus, for section 2-
708(1): Damages = Contract Price - Market Price + Incidentals - Expenses Saved. In
translation, Damages = Anticipated Benefits - Actual Benefits + Breach-Related Costs -
(Anticipated Performance and Enhancing Costs - Actual Performance and Enhancing
Costs). This can be rearranged as (Anticipated Benefits - Actual Benefits) - (Anticipated
Costs - Actual Costs), equivalent to the formula above.
"Profit" in section 2-708(2) is properly understood as anticipated surplus, which is
anticipated benefits less anticipated costs. "Due credit for payments and resale" for sellers
reflects actual benefits. "Expenses incurred" are actual costs other than breach-related costs.
Thus, section 2-708(2), Profit - Due Credit for Payments and Resale + Incidentals +
Expenses Incurred, translates as: Damages = (Anticipated Benefits - Anticipated Costs) -
Actual Benefits + Breach-Related Actual Costs + Actual Performance and Enhancing Costs.
This can be rearranged as: Damages = (Anticipated Benefits - Anticipated Costs) - (Actual
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Seller's Lost Surplus = Contract Price - Market Price.
The surplus-based rule applies to all cases of breach of contract. For
instance, in a seller's action for the price where the seller has fully
performed, as described in U.C.C. section 2-709,177 the seller's anticipated
and actual costs are unchanged, but the seller has realized no actual benefit:
Seller's Lost Surplus =
Contract Price - Actual Benefit = Contract Price - 0.
In a buyer's action for breach of warranty who has paid the contract
price, the diminished value to the buyer of the seller's performance is
reflected in the difference between the anticipated and actual benefit, as
reflected in the "difference in value" rule of U.C.C. section 2-714178 or the
"loss in value" approach of Restatement section 347(a):1
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Buyer's Lost Surplus = Anticipated Benefit -Actual Benefit.
If either buyer or seller actually incurs costs or realized benefits
different in amount from those he or she would have incurred had the other
performed, those are also reflected in the difference between anticipated
Benefits - Actual Costs), equivalent to the formula above.
177. "Price of goods" in section 2-709(1) for sellers is a measure of anticipated
benefits for goods accepted or conforming goods lost or damaged and identified to the
contract. "Resale price of goods" is an actual benefit. For section 2-709(1): Damages =
Price of Goods + Incidentals - Resale Price of Goods. In translation: Damages =
Anticipated Benefits + Breach-Related Actual Costs - Actual Benefits. Because anticipated
and actual performance and enhancing costs, i.e., all costs other than incidentals (breach-
related costs), are unchanged, this can be rearranged as: Damages = (Anticipated Benefits -
Actual Benefits) - (Anticipated Costs - Actual Costs), equivalent to the formula above.
178. The first of two formulas in section 2-714 allows recovery of damages determined
in any manner that is reasonable. For this approach the translation to the surplus-based
formula is obvious. To translate the second approach, recognize that "value of goods as
warranted is the difference between anticipated benefits and anticipated costs, while the
"value of goods accepted" is the difference between actual benefits and actual costs (aside
from breach-related costs, which are captured in incidentals and consequentials). Thus, for
section 2-714: Damages = Value of Goods as Warranted - Value of Goods as Accepted +
Incidentals + Consequentials. In translation, because incidental and consequential losses are
included as actual costs and the lost profit component of consequentials is already captured
in the difference between value as warranted and value as accepted, Damages = (Anticipated
Benefits -Actual Benefits) - (Anticipated Costs -Actual Costs), equivalent to the formula
above.
179. The "loss in value" in Restatement section 347 (a) refers to the difference between
anticipated and actual benefits. "Other losses caused by the breach" in (b) refers to the
breach-related cost component of actual costs. "Costs and other losses avoided" in (c) refers
to changes in performance and enhancement costs. Sections 347 (b) and (c) together make
up the difference between anticipated and actual benefits. Thus, for section 347: Damages =
Loss in Value + Other Losses - Costs Avoided. In translation, Damages = (Anticipated
Benefits - Actual Benefits) - (Anticipated Costs - Actual Costs), equivalent to the formula
above.
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and actual benefits and costs. Whether costs are anticipated or actual, the
surplus-based rule reflects the impact on damages of "expenses saved," as
in U.C.C. sections 2-706, 2-708, 2-712,180 and 2-713, of "other costs
incurred," as in Restatement section 347(c), costs heretofore labeled as
"incidental" and "consequential," in U.C.C. sections 2-710 and 2-715 and
Restatement section 347(b). The essence of the surplus-based rule is that
identifying differences between anticipated and actual benefits and between
anticipated and actual costs permits consideration of all cases within the
single formula:
Lost Surplus = Anticipated Benefit - Actual Benefit -
(Anticipated Cost - Actual Cost), which is equivalent to:
Lost Surplus = Anticipated Surplus - Actual Surplus
(as shown in section 1 of the Shadow Code).
Because the surplus-based rule reflects the approach to damage
calculation lying in the shadow of U.C.C. and Restatement rules, the old
rules still apply, as long as they are interpreted in a way that is consistent
with the underlying compensatory goal. The old rules may be useful, for
instance, where a seller does not wish to reveal her anticipated profit from
the sale or a buyer does not wish to reveal his anticipated profit from resale.
A seller's action for the price, as in U.C.C. section 2-709, for instance,
produces the same damages as the surplus-based rule without requiring that
potentially sensitive revelation. The Shadow Code expressly permits resort
to those rules.
180. As for section 2-712, lost benefits in section 2-713 are captured by consequential
damages. All other parts of the formula capture changes in cost, from the difference in
market and contract prices, incidentals, other consequentials, and expenses saved. Thus, for
section 2-712: Damages = Market Price - Contract Price + Incidentals + Consequentials -
Expenses Saved. In translation, Damages = (Anticipated Benefits - Actual Benefits) -
(Anticipated Performance and Enhancing Costs - Actual Performance, Enhancing, and
Breach-Related Costs), equivalent to the formula above.
* * *
